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Protecting Diversity in the Ivory
Tower with Liability Rules
Ting Wang*
Abstract
The two sides of the debate over race-based affirmative
action in higher education tell two distinct stories – one of
diversity’s benefits and the other of affirmative action’s burdens.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court
found the benefits to be so compelling to society that they were
deemed to outweigh the burdens. Voters in Michigan and other
states found otherwise and the Court in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. — (2014) upheld their right
to ban race-conscious admissions. Paradoxically, since the use
of race as a “plus factor” by selective universities to admit a few
underrepresented minority applicants makes possible a diverse
learning environment that benefits all students on campus, the
beneficiaries should far outnumber and outvote the few
applicants who are displaced. But because those actually
burdened are not known, the number of imagined victims is
easily inflated in the mind of electorate. In highlighting this and
other shortcomings of the Grutter regime, this article proposes
that if the benefits of diversity outweigh the burdens, the
universities should be able to demonstrate this favorable costbenefit ratio by accommodating the real burden-bearers.
Accommodation could come in the form of direct
compensation for the displaced students or indirect burdenshifting – getting others to give up their seats. Shifting the
The author (Yale Law School, J.D. 2005, Harvard University, AB-AM, 2002)
is an associate at the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP. He wishes to thank
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and Daniel Walfish for their guidance and suggestions, and Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor and Judge John M. Walker, Jr. for their encouragement. The
views expressed are entirely his. He welcomes reader feedback and can be
reached at ting.wang@aya.yale.edu.
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burden to those who are more willing to bear it can lower the
cost of settlement. In-kind benefits and gifts could be used
instead of monetary compensation.
Addressing the
displacement burden would reduce much of the grievances
against racial preferences in admissions, and reveal to the public
how little affirmative action affects the vast majority of
applicants. Of course, it would impose costs on the university,
but the willingness of universities to take on these costs also
demonstrates their commitment to the benefits of diversity. A
skeptical Court in Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. —(2013) remanded for lower courts to determine whether raceconscious admissions are still necessary when the university
was already achieving on-campus diversity through race-neutral
means. Accommodation could provide a convincing showing that
the extra benefits from using the race-plus factor are indeed
worth the costs.
Lastly, accommodation would give universities a much
stronger incentive to address the academic achievement gap
across racial groups, which makes affirmative action necessary
in the first place. Grutter permits the use of race in admissions
for 25 years to eliminate this gap. But scant evidence of progress
over the past decade raises concerns that the universities are
perpetuating the gap by holding students of different racial
groups to different standards. If accommodation is required,
universities would find it in their interest to encourage those
minority students who could be accepted with the help of the
race-plus factor to improve their academic credentials further so
they could be admitted without triggering the need to
accommodate a displaced applicant. Only then will the gap start
to narrow and lead to the realization of Grutter’s goal – achieving
diversity without resorting to race-conscious means.
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Introduction

Ten years after Grutter v. Bollinger endorsed the University
of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions program
with a 25-year operating license, the same dispute returned to
the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action after Michigan’s voters approved a state constitutional
ban of racial preferences. 1 The High Court, in affirming the
right of the electorate to effectively reverse itself, has cleared the
way for more states to overturn Grutter via the political process.2
For supporters of affirmative action who had won the proverbial
battle but are now losing the war, this turnabout is both
paradoxical and predictable.
It is paradoxical because affirmative action in higher
education should be a consistent political winner. When
selective colleges and universities (“schools”) consider the race of
a few of underrepresented minority applicants as a “plus factor”
to accept them, they create diverse learning environments that
benefit all students on their campuses. The Grutter Court
agreed with amici that graduates of these schools go on to
contribute to society as better citizens, professionals, and
ultimately, leaders in a diverse, inclusive and united country.3
Hence, the educational benefits of diversity were held to be
compelling to the government, and could justify, at least for a
time, race-conscious means to achieve diversity. Using racial
preferences to admit a few minority applicants also displaces an
equally few if not fewer number of other applicants who would
have been accepted had the admissions policy been “raceneutral.”
These rejected applicants, who bear the true
displacement burden of affirmative action, are far outnumbered
by the beneficiaries of diversity. When the numbers are such,
affirmative action’s supporters ought to consistently outvote its
opponents. 4 In Michigan, the three counties with state

1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. For states that have already banned affirmative action in public higher
education, see infra Table 1 and note 22. For states that may be planning antiaffirmative action ballot initiatives, see infra note 272.
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32.
4. See infra Part III.B.2.
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universities expressly targeted by the proposed constitutional
ban all voted against the ban.5
The turnabout is predictable because of a common
misperception about the impact of admissions preferences.
Selective schools reject far more applicants than they admit but
those actually displaced by racial preferences constitute only a
small fraction of the rejected applicant pool. Since these real
cost-bearers are not identified, many more rejected applicants
(and their parents and sympathizers) will blame or resent
affirmative action. 6 As the competition to gain admission to
selective schools increases, so does misplaced resentment
against race-conscious admissions policies. Those who do not get
to participate in the diverse learning environment are also less
likely to believe the benefits of diversity. Thus when the
perceived cost of the program is inflated and its benefits are
undervalued, the otherwise favorable cost-benefit balance is
subverted and the public will vote to ban, as all 80 of Michigan’s
other counties did.7
To counter this dynamic, this article proposes that schools
should accommodate the few who are really displaced to dispel
the misplaced resentment of the many. Only then could the
public understand that rather than a social engineering project
of mythic proportions, affirmative action has always been a
limited, marginal remedy used by some selective schools to
create racially-diverse campuses that help far more than
burden. The rule-maker, whether a judge, legislator or voter,
can modify the current Grutter regime by requiring that schools
“internalize” the burdens they create from using race in
admissions.
A school can internalize the burden by
accommodating those who are displaced or other applicants who
agree to take on the burden. Accommodation, which can be
monetary, gift-oriented or in-kind, induces the displaced
applicants or other eligible applicants to give up their claim to a
seat for a race-plus admit.
So long as a school can certify that it has accounted for the
burdens from each use of the race-plus factor, its admissions

5. See infra note 55.
6. See infra Part III.B.2.
7. See infra note 55.
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program should be deemed “narrowly tailored” to satisfy the
Court’s strict scrutiny standard. Such a regime would be
simpler for judges to review than any test that relies on the
schools’ “complex educational judgments” which have
confounded the courts. 8 Furthermore, accommodation would
demonstrate that no one is made worse off in the course of
creating a racially-diverse campus, so the public could be
assured that the benefits of diversity do indeed outweigh the
burdens.
Schools have been reluctant to identify the applicants they
displace because (1) they have not had to, (2) they fear litigation,
(3) they do not know how to settle with these individuals, and (4)
it might be costly. This article asserts that the schools should
settle when the cost of not settling is higher. 9 Faced with
outright bans across the country, schools can no longer ignore
the displacement impact of their admissions policies. In
exchange for taking on the burden of admissions prices, schools
would be shielded from liability for their race-conscious
admissions decisions. The switch from absolute to conditional
legal protection for affirmative action allows for more flexible
accommodation mechanisms based on liability rules, which are
more adept at drawing out private valuations and lowering
settlement costs. 10 The actual burden on the displaced is
believed to be light, and the settlement mechanism can cost-shift
and allow others to take on the burden for less. If compensatory
transactions raise moral concerns about commodifying
admissions, accommodation could be arranged through gifts in
accord with the concept of market-inalienability.11
The accommodation requirement would prompt schools to
do more about the academic achievement gap across racial
groups, the real cause for the need to use race in admissions.
The Court in Grutter recognized this problem and required
schools to use the race-plus factor not only to overcome the gap
but to narrow it.
Over the past decade, however, the

8. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. For a discussion of the remand in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), see infra Part IV.B.
9. For Michelman’s efficiency model, see infra Part IV.D.
10. For Calabresi and Malamed’s liability rules, see infra Part V.A.
11. For Radin’s market-inalienability rules, see infra Part V.C.
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achievement gap has remained virtually unchanged.12 The lack
of progress shows that the schools are not prepared for Grutter’s
sunset, and may be vulnerable to criticism that they are helping
to perpetuate the achievement gap by holding applicants of
different racial groups to different standards.13 Once the schools
begin to internalize the burden, they will have much greater
incentive to expand the pipeline of minority students who can be
admitted without the help of race as a plus factor. 14 When
schools can achieve diversity entirely through such applicants,
they would no longer need to accommodate anyone, and the
accommodation requirement proposed here will obviate itself.
This article is composed of six parts. The political backlash
against affirmative action in higher education (discussed in Part
I) is aggravated by several shortcomings in the Grutter regime
(identified in Part II). In Part III, the benefits of diversity and
burdens of affirmative action are examined in turn and then
analyzed together using a cost-benefit analysis that also
considers the cost of ignoring the problem of inflated burdens.
Part IV explains the paradigm shift proposed in this article from
the standpoint of liability rules, constitutional jurisprudence
and the critique of market inalienability. Part V outlines
various designs for the accommodation mechanism that schools
could choose from and customize. Part VI assesses the impact
of accommodation on schools, students, and society.
II. Political Backlash
In the decade since the nine Justices decided Grutter v.
Bollinger, more than nine million citizens have cast their own
votes on the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action.15
State actions permitted by the Federal Constitution can
nevertheless be banned by state constitutions and laws.16 From
2003 to 2012, four states – Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona and
12. See infra Part III.B.3.
13. See infra Part III.B.4.
14. See infra Part VII.A.
15. See infra Table 1 and note 22.
16. “Grutter never said, or even hinted, that state universities must do
what they narrowly may do.” Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm,
473 F.3d 237, 249 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Oklahoma – through voter initiatives, amended their state
constitutions to bar race-based admissions preferences at state
universities, joining California and Washington whose
electorates had approved earlier bans.17 In 2014, the Supreme
Court upheld the right of voters to do so in Schuette, effectively
foreclosing further court challenges against such enactments by
affirmative action’s supporters. 18 Counting New Hampshire,
where the state legislature passed a statutory ban in 2011,19 and
Florida, where racial preferences in admissions were ended via
executive order,20 more than a quarter of the country now lives
in states that have ended affirmative action through the political
process.21

17. See infra Table 1 and note 22.
18. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701
F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
132 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
19. H.B. 623, 2011 Gen. Ct., 162nd Sess. (N.H. 2011) (became effective on
Jan. 1, 2012).
20. Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999).
21. Based on a tally of the 2010 U.S. Census figures. 2010 Census Data,
U.S. CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/ (last visited May
31, 2015).
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Table 1: Anti-Affirmative Action Initiatives Decided by Voters22
State

Year

Initiative

California

1995 Proposition

Votes
For

Pct.

5,268,462 54.6%

Votes
Against

Pct.

4,388,733

45.4% CAL. CONST.

209
Washington 1998 Initiative 200

Enactment, if
any
Art. 1, § 31

1,099,410 58.2%

788,930

41.8% WASH. REV.
CODE §
49.60.400
(1999).

Michigan

2006 Proposal 2

2,141,010 57.9%

1,555,691

42.1% MICH. CONST.
Art. 1, § 26.

Colorado

2008 Amendment

1,102,046 49.2%

1,138,134

50.8% -

404,766

298,401

42.4% NEB. CONST.

46
Nebraska

2008 Initiative 424

57.6%

Art 1, § 30.
Arizona

2010 Proposition

952,086

59.5%

647,713

40.5% ARIZ. CONST.

2012 State Question 745,854

59.2%

514,163

40.8% OKLA. CONST.

107
Oklahoma

759

Art. 2, § 36
Art. 2, §36

Far from settling, even temporarily, the great affirmative
action debate, Grutter has merely pushed it from the judicial to
the political arena. 23 With the change of venue, affirmative
22. For sources of voting results, see State of Arizona Official Canvass 1,
ARIZ.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE
(2010),
available
at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/General/Canvass2010GE.pdf;
SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE 34-36, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (1996),
available
at
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/ssov/ssovcomplete.pdf; OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTE CAST FOR THE
2008 PRIMARY 2008 GENERAL 137, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE (2008), available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/2008/2008_Abstract.pdf;
November 7, 2006 Election Results, State Proposal – 06-2: Constitutional
Amendment to Ban Affirmative Action Programs, MICH. SEC’Y OF STATE (2006)
[hereinafter
Michigan
2006
Results],
http://miboecfr.nicusa.com/election/results/06GEN/90000002.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015); November 6, 2012 Official Results: Federal, State, Legislative
and Judicial Races, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (2012), available at
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/12gen_seb.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2015); November 3, 1998 General Election Results, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE
(1998), http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=10&c=&c2=&t
=&t2=&p=&p2=&y= (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
23 . See, e.g., EndRacePreferences, Opposition Member Harasses and
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action’s opponents have seized on the promise of race-blind
equality and adopted the rhetoric of the Civil Rights
Movement.24 Affirmative action’s supporters have fought back
vigorously through litigation and political mobilization, 25 but
have only slowed the advance of the “civil rights initiatives.”
They have kept the question off the ballot in several states,26 and
narrowly defeated Colorado’s Amendment 46 in 2008. 27 But
efforts to turn the tide, to have the public endorse affirmative
action, have been unsuccessful. A counter-initiative in Colorado
failed to gather enough signatures in 2008. 28 An upswell of
Intimidates OkCRI Circulator, YOUTUBE (uploaded Nov. 14, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Csr2rnWvn94 (supporters and opponents
of affirmative action arguing in the parking lot of Tulsa grocery store).
24 . See ARIZONA BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE: ARGUMENTS “FOR”
PROPOSITION 107 34, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (2010) [hereinafter ARGUMENTS
“FOR”
PROPOSITION
107],
available
at
apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop107.pdf
(statement by Steve Montenegro, State Representative, Litchfield Park,
invoking the words of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.); NOVEMBER GENERAL
ELECTION PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (2010),
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/Info/Misc_Info.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2015); INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INITIATIVE 424,
NEB.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE
(2008),
available
at
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/2008/pdf/pamphlet%20424.pdf
(“This
constitutional amendment mirrors the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act and
advances true equality and fairness by prohibiting discrimination and
preferential treatment based on race, gender, and color.”).
25 . See, e.g., Melissa Hart, The State-by-State Assault on Equal
Opportunity, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1, 10-13 (Sept. 2008), available
at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Hart_issue_brief.pdf;
Jessica
Larson & Stephen Menendian, Anti-Affirmative Action Ballot Initiatives,
KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY 1, 3-12 (Dec. 2008),
available
at
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/12_2008_AntiAffirmativeAc
tionBallotInitiatives.pdf; see also Valerie Richardson, Colorado Takes Aim at
Race,
Sex
Preferences,
WASH.
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2007),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/apr/24/20070424-1216441418r/?page=all; Naomi Zeveloff, Affirmative Attack: Colorado Diversity
Programs Targeted Again, COLO. SPRINGS INDEP. (May 3, 2007),
http://www.csindy.com/coloradosprings/affirmative-attack/
Content?oid=1138314.
26. Hart supra note 25, at 10-11; Larson & Menendian, supra note 25, at
3-7.
27. See Colleen Slevin, Colorado Voters Reject Affirmative Action Ban,
ASPEN
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2008),
http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20081107/NEWS/811079959.
28. Hart supra note 25, at 11-12 (discussing Colorado Initiative 82).
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Asian-American opposition in the spring of 2014 halted a
California State Senate proposal to ask voters to reinstate raceconscious admissions.29
The involvement of more people, resources and passion has
not brought greater clarity to this controversy.
Despite
overwhelming amici support for diversity in higher education,
which persuaded the Grutter majority that race-conscious
admissions benefits society as a whole, the supporters cannot
show that the benefits of diversity outweigh the burdens of
affirmative action. Though very few applicants are actually
displaced by the race-plus preference, there are no publicly
available figures, and the fear of being harmed is easily inflated
in the mind of the public, 30 especially as acceptance rates at
selective schools fall into the single digits31 and opponents make
personal appeals about being wronged by race-based
preferences.32
To understand the causes of the political backlash against
Grutter, we must begin with the opinion itself.
III. Grutter’s Legacy
A. What Grutter Decided
Grutter is commonly thought of as a narrowly decided 5-4
opinion, but it could also be read as a three-part ruling with
support from five, six and seven Justices. The central doctrinal
feature of Grutter is the Court’s recognition that the benefits of
29. Katy Murphy, California Asian-Americans Show Strength in Blocking
Affirmative Action Revival, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:07 PM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci_25363174/california-asianamericans-show-strength-blocking-affirmative-action?source=pkg.
30 . See infra Part III.B.2 for an illustration of the actual extent of
displacement at the Michigan Law School in Grutter and explanation of the
inflated burden.
31. Twelve colleges and universities rejected more than ninety percent of
their applicants during the fall 2013 admissions cycle. Best College Rankings
and Lists: Top 100 – Lowest Acceptance Rates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS,
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/lowestacceptance-rate?src=stats (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
32. See, e.g., ARGUMENTS “FOR” PROPOSITION 107, supra note 24, at 35, 37
(statements by Jennifer Gratz of Sacramento, California and Frank Ricci of
Wallingford, Connecticut).
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diversity in higher education are compelling to the government
and could justify racial preferences in admissions. This position
actually drew the support of six Justices, the five who signed
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy, who
dissented on other grounds. 33 They were persuaded that
diversity in higher education helps foster a more cohesive
country, especially in the training of future leaders 34 and
reaffirmed Justice Powell’s single-vote endorsement of the
diversity rationale in Bakke.35
The main operative feature of Grutter, also the narrowest
part of the holding, focuses on how schools may use race to
achieve diversity. With quotas already banned by Bakke and
extra points in admissions formulas struck down in Gratz, the
five Justices of the O’Connor majority settled on using race as a
“plus factor” in a school’s individualized review of applications
as the only permissible racial preference. 36 The concept of
individualized or holistic review had also been endorsed by
Justice Powell in Bakke, who praised the admissions program of
Harvard College (“Harvard Plan”) for considering applicants
individually, as opposed to data points in formulas, and looking
for personal qualities “that may contribute to educational

33. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392-93, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering
race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity . . . .”).
34. Id. at 308, 342, 332 (“Universities . . . represent the training ground
for a large number of the Nation’s leaders . . . . [N]othing less than ‘the nation’s
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples . . . . Effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our
Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”).
35. Justice Powell, whose opinion bridged a pair of opposing four-justice
voting blocks and became the ruling of the Court, was the only Justice in Bakke
to mention the diversity rationale. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 312-14 (1978). Justice Powell had characterized the government as
holding “a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin.” Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). Grutter upgraded this
interest to compelling status. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. Justice Kennedy
agreed. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[S]tudent body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions.”).
36. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 295-97 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 325, 328.
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pluralism.”37 According to the Harvard Plan, when two equally
admissible applicants are compared as individuals, the race of
the minority applicant might be deemed a plus that “may tip the
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a
farm may tip the balance in other.”38
To Justice Powell’s explanation of individualized
admissions review, the O’Connor majority added the concept of
“critical mass,” defined more or less as the “meaningful
numbers” of underrepresented minority students that a school
needs to enroll to produce the kind of educational benefits that
the government finds compelling.39 Rejected applicants are not
unduly harmed by the race-based preferences, Justice O’Connor
concluded, citing Justice Powell, who had reasoned that since
these applicants were also reviewed individually for their
potential to contribute to diversity on campus, they would “have
no basis to complain of unequal treatment.” 40 In effect, the
O’Connor majority found individualized review, as opposed to
quotas or formulas, to have reduced the impact of race on
applicants of non-favored races sufficiently that whatever
burdens they may complain of are far outweighed by the
important benefits that diversity provides.41
37 . See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (listing qualifications valued by the
Harvard Plan: “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service
experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or
other qualifications deemed important.”); cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-15 (“Law
School looks for individuals [who can contribute] in diverse ways to the wellbeing others.” The admissions policy assesses applicants for their “potential ‘to
contribute to the learning of those around them . . . policy aspires to ‘achieve
that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.’”).
38. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323. Similarly, Grutter permits schools to “consider
race or ethnicity only as a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file . . . [along with]
all [other] pertinent elements of diversity . . . of the particular qualifications of
each applicant . . . although not necessarily according them the same weight.”
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
This race-plus factor could be “outcome
determinative” to the extent that the “plus” given to “the race of an applicant
may tip the balance in [favor of his admission].” Id. at 339.
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
40. Id. at 441 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
41. “To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must
not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and
ethnic groups.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added) (citing Metro Broad.
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). Justice
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Justice Kennedy differed from the majority not so much in
how individualized review is designed to work – he lauded the
race-conscious admissions programs of the “Little Ivy League”
liberal arts colleges – but expressed doubts about how race was
actually being used by the Michigan Law School. 42 He noted
that the enrollment of underrepresented minority students
fluctuated very slightly from year to year and that the
admissions office actively tracked the number of minority
applicants accepted on a daily basis.43 To him, these were signs
that the school was trying to fulfill quasi-quota targets.44 The
degree to which race-conscious admissions programs ought to be
scrutinized by the courts remains a point of controversy in
Fisher whose opinion was written by Justice Kennedy.45
The part of the Grutter ruling that received the broadest
support is the durational limit on the use of race in admissions.46
Having extolled the virtues of diversity, Justice O’Connor
nevertheless reaffirmed the “core purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” to “do away
with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race”
and made clear that the use of race in admissions cannot
continue indefinitely.47 She urged schools to search actively for
O’Connor then concluded, “[w]e agree that, in the context of its individualized
inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law
School’s race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants.” Id. (emphasis added). See also infra Part V.C. for further
discussion of the burden and infra Part V.B. on the Court’s balancing of the
benefits and burdens through the strict scrutiny test.
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (noting that, in contrast, the liberal arts colleges did “not keep
ongoing tallies of racial or ethnic composition of their entering students.”).
44. Id. (“The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the
admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review
save for race itself. . . . The bonus factor of race would then become divorced
from individual review; it would be premised instead on the numerical
objective set by the Law School.”).
45. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see infra Part IV.B.
46. On this point, Justice O’Connor directly rebutted the Sixth Circuit,
which declined to impose a durational requirement and was satisfied that “the
Law School intends to consider race and ethnicity to achieve a diverse and
robust student body only until it becomes possible to enroll a ‘critical mass’ of
under-represented minority students through race-neutral means.” Grutter v.
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002).
47. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
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race-neutral means to achieve campus diversity so they could
terminate their race-conscious admissions programs “as soon as
practicable.” 48 She expressed “hope” that efforts to improve
education of underrepresented minority students will narrow
the “achievement gap” so that race-conscious measures will no
longer be necessary in 25 years’ time.49 This sunset clause drew
concurrences from Justices Thomas and Scalia.50
Hence, Grutter marks the beginning of a transition in
American higher education from race-conscious to race-neutral
or race-blind means to achieve campus diversity. The Court
realized that the need to use race in admissions arises from the
achievement gap, which leaves a shortage of competitive
underrepresented minority applicants for selective schools to
assemble critical masses via race-neutral or race-blind methods,
so the success of the transition turns on efforts to narrow the
achievement gap. To this end, Justice O’Connor held that raceconscious admissions programs approved in Grutter (the
“Grutter regime”) must not only produce campus diversity but
must also eliminate the achievement gap itself. The “acid test”
for race-conscious admissions programs, she noted, “will be their
efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic
preferences at all.”51
B. Grutter’s Shortcomings
Grutter gave race-conscious admissions policy a
considerable judicial lease, but the ballot box backlash against
affirmative action is undermining the regime well before the
sunset period has elapsed. Though the reasons for the backlash

48 . Id. at 343. The Supreme Court was more forceful about this
requirement than the Sixth Circuit, which was content to accept that the
“admissions policy is ‘sensit[ive] to the possibility that [it] might someday have
satisfied its purpose.’” Grutter, 288 F.3d at 752.
49. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (“The court expects that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.”).
50. See id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in judgment);
id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 344 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (quoting Nathaniel Nathanson & Casimir J.
Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority
Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHI. B. REC. 282, 293 (May–June 1977)).
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are manifold, several flaws in the Grutter regime itself are
contributing to its demise. The Grutter regime obscures the true
benefit-balance of diversity programs, leaving doubters
unconvinced of diversity’s benefits, and supporters deprived of
facts to dispel public misconceptions. The regime provides no
way to track the transition toward the race-neutral future it
mandates and may in fact be creating headwinds against the
transition. Any reforms to the regime must address these flaws.
1. A Polarized Debate
For decades, supporters of affirmative action have touted
the benefits of diversity while skeptics complained about the
unfairness of displacement by racial preferences. This division
in the debate is reinforced by the way race-conscious admissions
programs keep the two sides from seeing each other’s claims.
Diversity is an experienced good; one has to experience the
diverse learning environment to appreciate its benefits.
Students in this environment are surrounded by fellow
beneficiaries and express strong support for affirmative action.
In a 1999 Gallup survey, 91% of students at the Michigan Law
School reported diversity as having a positive impact on their
educational experience. 52 These students, however, are less
likely to consider the grievances felt by those who think they
were harmed by admissions preferences because those
individuals have been rejected out of view.53
The rejected applicants who do not get to partake in the
diverse learning environment are less likely to believe the
benefits. They are more likely to complain about the unfairness
of getting displaced. This difference in perspective is neatly
encapsulated in the case of Patrick Hamacher and his girlfriend,
Kathleen Hadden. Hamacher, who is white, was rejected by the
University of Michigan and became a co-plaintiff in Gratz.
52. See Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education:
Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143, 160-61 (Gary Orfield &
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001). The survey interviewed 81% of the students at
Michigan Law School and Harvard Law School. Id. at 154.
53. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) (Justice Scalia noting that those particular Michigan Law
School students had already been admitted).
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Hadden, who is also white, disagrees with his lawsuit because
she attended the University and feels the racially-diverse
learning environment enriched her educational experience. 54
The difference in perception is also reflected in voting patterns
on Proposal 2, which prevailed in 80 of Michigan’s 83 counties.55
The three counties that had majority “no” votes happen to be
home to the three universities, Michigan, Michigan State and
Wayne State, which Proposal 2 expressly targeted. Wayne
County, home to Detroit, had a population that was just over
40% black, but the other two counties, Ingham and Washtenaw,
were over three-quarters white. 56 Their votes reflect the
concentration of diversity’s beneficiaries in and around the
campuses where the benefits are created and most keenly felt.57
The Grutter majority was persuaded by the beneficiaries,
and allowed the benefits that flow from student body diversity
to override the burdens cited by the opponents, who were
infuriated by the ruling and unconvinced of its conclusions. 58
Despite calls for dialogue, the two sides entrenched in their fixed
positions continue to talk past each other. 59 As hundreds of
54. Jacques Steinberg, 3 Look to College Suit to Show Their Merits, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/us/3-look-tocollege-suit-to-show-their-merits.html.
55. See the following table:
Table A: Proposal 2 results – five counties with the highest percentage of
“No” votes.
County
“Yes” votes
“No” Votes
“Yes” pct.
“No” pct.
Wayne
254,545
367,716
40.9%
59.1%
Washtenaw
55,796
75,427
42.5%
57.5%
Ingham
49,539
53,235
48.2%
51.8%
Kalamazoo
48,504
43,489
52.7%
47.3%
Isabella
9,852
8,543
53.6%
46.4%
Michigan 2006 Results, supra note 22.
56. See Estimated Population of Michigan by Age, Race and Sex: 20002008, MICH. DEP’T TECH., MGMT. & BUDGET [hereinafter Michigan Population],
http://www.michigan.gov/cgi/0,4548,7-158-54534_51713_51714-214745-,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
57. The two counties with the next highest proportions of votes against
Proposal 2, Kalamazoo and Isabella, are home to Western Michigan University
and Central Michigan University, respectively. See Table A, supra note 55.
Both counties had populations over 80% white. See Michigan Population,
supra note 56.
58. See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.C.
59. See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Delicate Obama Path on Class and Race
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2008),
Preferences,
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thousands go through the ordeal of applying to college and
graduate school each year, fresh recruits are added to each side
of this polarizing controversy.
The benefits of diversity have broad cross-racial appeal, but
racial preferences are divisive. In a nationwide survey of over
1,800 high school juniors conducted in May of 2004, 82%
considered racial preferences to be unfair and 78% said using
race, ethnicity and religious background as admissions factors
affects the way non-minority students feel about minority
students.60 But two-thirds felt they benefited from diversity in
high school, and 70% said it was important to have a diverse
environment at the college they attend.61 In other words, the
majority of those surveyed wants the benefits of diversity but is
concerned about the burdens of racial preferences.62
The fear and disappointment of rejection along with
perceived unfairness of racial preferences can create potent
political opposition to affirmative action. Younger generations
of voters with fresh memories of their own experience with
admissions in higher education are more likely to oppose
affirmative action. A national poll conducted in 2003 found
young people between ages 18 and 27 opposed affirmative action
by a much greater margin, 67% against to 22% in favor, than
those over age 65, whose opposition to affirmative action ran
45% to 34%. 63 Unwilling to wait for Grutter to sunset, the
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/us/politics/03affirmative.html?pagewante
d=1&_r=0 (John Payton, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, calling for a thoughtful national conversation about race and class).
60. Laura Kujawski, Students Value Diversity in High School and College,
PNNONLINE
(Sept.
22,
2004),
http://www.amren.com/news/2004/09/students_value/ (reporting the results of
the survey conducted by National Research Center for College and University
Admissions).
61. Id.
62 . In a survey of medical students at Harvard University and the
University of San Francisco, 86% reported that diversity had enhanced their
learning experience, but only 57% expressed support for affirmative action.
Dean K. Whitla et al., Educational Benefits of Diversity in Medical School: A
Survey of Students, 78 ACAD. MED. 460, 466 (2003).
63 . David Savage, Bush’s Opposition to Racial Preferences Gets Big
Support, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at 16. In April 2014, a survey by MTV of 1424 year-old millennials’ found significant majorities of both young white people
(74%) and people of color (65%) opposed preferential treatment given to one
race over another, regardless of historical inequalities. MTV STRATEGIC
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INSIGHTS & DAVID BINDER RES., BIAS SURVEY SUMMARY 4 (2014), available at
http://cdn.lookdifferent.org/content/studies/000/000/001/DBR_MTV_Bias_Sur
vey_Executive_Summary.pdf?1398858309.
Public polling of attitudes toward affirmative action is heavily influenced by
how the question is phrased. Four national polls, conducted from May through
June of 2013, yielded disparate results, which are compared below:
Table B: Summary of Polls and Surveys
Poll

Question

Response

Do you favor or oppose affirmative Favor 53%
NYT- action programs for minorities in
Oppose
CBS hiring,
promoting
and
college
38%
admissions?
Now let me read you two brief
statements on affirmative action
programs, and ask which one comes
closer to your own point of view.
A: Affirmative action programs are
still needed to counteract the effects of
A: 45%
NBCdiscrimination against minorities, and
WSJ
B: 45%
are a good idea as long as there are no
rigid quotas.
B: Affirmative action programs have
gone too far in favoring minorities, and
should be ended because they unfairly
discriminate against whites.
Do you support or oppose allowing Support
22%
WaPo universities to consider applicants’ race
- ABC as a factor in deciding which students
Oppose
to admit?
76%
In order to make up for past
discrimination, do you favor or Favor 68%
oppose programs which make special
Oppose
efforts to help blacks and other
24%
PRRI minorities get ahead?
Do you think blacks and other
Yes 29%
minorities should receive preference
in college admissions to make up for No 64%
past inequalities, or not?

Margin
of
Error

Sample
Size

±3%

1,022

±3.1%

1,000

±3.5%

≈1,000

±3.1%

1,000

PUB. RELIGION RES. INST., PRRI RELIGION AND POLITICS TRACKING POLL (2013),
available at http://publicreligion.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/MayReligion-Politics-Topline1.pdf; America’s Views on the Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/06/us/new-york-times-cbs-newspoll-june-2013.html?_r=1& (last updated June 6, 2013); Domenico Montanaro,
NBC News/WSJ Poll: Affirmative Action Support at Historic Low, NBC NEWS
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opponents have found success taking their grievance-oriented
message directly to the electorate.64 In this regard, they have
been aided by a powerful but misplaced force, the “false burdenbearer” effect.
2. False Victim Effect
According to a 1995 California poll that found strong public
support for banning race-based preferences (71.7% in favor
versus 21.6% against), more than half of the respondents said
they personally knew someone who was hurt by affirmative
action, and nearly three-fifths said they did not know anyone
who was helped.65 Proposition 209 was approved the following
year. The public’s perception is distorted by the lack of accurate
information about affirmative action, whose adverse impact is
often greatly overstated.66
(June
11,
2013
4:41
AM),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/11/18885926-nbc-newswsj-pollaffirmative-action-support-at-historic-low; Post-ABC Poll: Same-Sex Marriage
and
Affirmative
Action,
WASH.
POST
(June
11,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/11/
National-Politics/Polling/question_11128.xml?uuid=-Z5dxtKlEeKzojv16ze5
0A. In these polls, public support for affirmative action tends to be stronger
when the program is described as broadly helping minorities, as shown in the
New York Times/CBS News (“NYT-CBS”) poll. The NBC News/Wall Street
Journal (“NBC-WSJ”) poll, which shows an even split over continuing or
ending affirmative action, found support for continuing it at a historic low. The
Washington Post/ABC (“WaPo-ABC”) poll, which specifically asked about
universities’ consideration of race in the admission process, drew majority
opposition from whites, blacks, and Hispanics. The dichotomy in attitude
toward helping minorities “get ahead” and giving race-based preferences in
admissions is vividly captured in the Public Religion Research Institute
(“PRRI”) poll, which found 68% supporting the former and 64% opposing the
latter (including 57% who had supported the first question). This disparity is
also reflected in other polls regarding affirmative action over the past decade.
In short, the public appears to be much more sensitive about race-based
preferences in admissions than other types of affirmative action programs.
64. Two weeks after the Supreme Court released the Gratz and Grutter
decisions in June 2003, Jennifer Gratz and Barbara Grutter launched the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative. See Ward Connerly, Taking it to Michigan,
NAT’L
REV.
(July
8,
2003),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/207428/taking-it-michigan/wardconnerly.
65. NICOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
MERITOCRACY 294 (1999).
66. When asked how often affirmative action programs that are designed
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As an initial matter, race plays no role in the admissions
outcomes at over 60% of America’s colleges.67 A 2003 survey of
chief admission officers found that while 68% of schools were
guided by mission statements that encourage racial diversity,
only one-third actually considered race or ethnicity as a factor in
admissions.68 Only at the highly selective schools, which reject
a significant portion of their applicants, could racial-preferences
be used to displace or “hurt” certain applicants from non-favored
groups.69
Some of the most selective and prestigious schools may
consider race but need not actually use it as a plus factor because
they can achieve on-campus diversity entirely through
underrepresented minority applicants who have sufficiently
strong credentials to be accepted without the extra boost. 70
These students (the “unassisted minority admits”) are among
the most sought after in American higher education. Due to the
achievement gap, however, there is a shortage of such
applicants, so many selective schools must resort to the raceplus factor to admit other underrepresented minority students
(the “race-plus admits”) to assemble what they consider to be
to help women and minorities get better jobs and education “end up depriving
someone else of their rights[,]” 34% of respondents said “almost always” or
“quite a lot[,]” 47% said “occasionally” and 9% said “almost never.” See Savage,
supra note 63.
67 . See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College
Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971, 977-78 (1998) (“At the least selective 60
percent of colleges, being black or Hispanic had little effect on an applicant’s
chances of admissions.”); see also Dennis J. Shields, Some Observations about
Grutter, JURIST ONLINE SYMP. (Sept. 5, 2003), available at
www.jurist.org/forum/symposium-aa/.
68 . NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLLEGE ADMISSION COUNSELING, DIVERSITY AND
COLLEGE ADMISSION IN 2003: A SURVEY REPORT XI (2003), available at
http://www.nacacnet.org/issues-action/policy/Documents/Diversity%20Report
%20Web.pdf.
69. See Kane, supra note 67, at 971 (noting that only schools in the top
one-fifth in academic selectivity deny significant proportions of their
applicants); see also NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLLEGE ADMISSION COUNSELING, supra
note 68, at 12 (Among schools “perceived as more selective in the admission
process[,]” about half reported considering race as a factor.).
70. In Grutter, Justice Kennedy noted the same in his dissent: “About 80%
to 85% of the places in the entering class are given to applicants in the upper
range of Law School Admissions Test scores and grades. An applicant with
these credentials likely will be admitted without consideration of race or
ethnicity.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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meaningful minority representation on campus. 71 Currently,
there is virtually no publicly available information about the
extent to which schools rely on the race-plus factor to achieve
their desired level of campus diversity.72
What is not in doubt is that at schools where affirmative
action is instituted, race-plus admits are relatively few in
number compared to the rest of the applicant pool. Consider the
Michigan Law School, which accepted 1,249 applicants including
170 underrepresented minority students to fill about 400 spaces
in the incoming class in 2000. 73 According to the expert
testimony for the Law School at trial in Grutter, if race had not
been considered, the school could only have admitted 46
underrepresented minority applicants, which means the
remaining 124 (out of the 170) were race-plus admits.74 Among
the former, 16 enrolled and among the latter, 42 did.75 Thus,
only 124 out of 3,432 applicants overall actually received the
race-plus boost (a mere 3.6%), and the 42 matriculants among
them more than tripled the underrepresented minority student
presence (from 16 to 58).
Diversity comes at the expense of those applicants of nonfavored groups who, in the absence of racial preferences, would

71. According to Michigan Law School’s former Director of Admissions,
Allan Stillwagon, about half of the minority applicants admitted in the 198990 application cycle were chosen based on “the numbers” – meaning their LSAT
score and undergraduate grade point average, as well as other interesting
qualities – and the other half were chosen through the race-conscious
admissions policy adopted to increase minority enrollment. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Thus, half of the
admitted minority students were unassisted minority whose admission did not
require racial preferences and did not displace anyone else on the basis of race.
Id.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319-20, 333 (recognizing the need for a “critical
mass” of minorities on campus to realize the educational benefits of a diverse
student body).
73. Id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at
839 (summarizing the testimony of Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the law school
expert). The Law School enrolled 399 first year JD students in the fall of 2000.
The University of Michigan - Ann Arbor Graduate-Professional Enrollment by
Class Level and Gender for Term 1310 (Fall 2000), OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR,
UNIV. OF MICH. (2001), available at www.ro.umich.edu/report/00fa113.pdf.
74. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (summarizing the testimony of Dr.
Stephen Raudenbush, the law school expert).
75. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320 (referring to Dr. Raudenbush’s testimony).
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have been admitted. 76 Only these displaced applicants (the
“would-be admits”) can legitimately claim to have been
burdened by affirmative action in admissions.77 The Law School
estimates that had race not been a factor, only about 80 other
applicants would have been accepted.78 It may seem odd that
the acceptance of 124 race-plus admits would displace only 80
applicants from non-favored groups.
This is so because
underrepresented minority applicants tend to have more schools
to choose from and have lower admissions yield than the average
applicant. 79 If the Law School could not consider race, it would
have needed to accept about 80 non-minority applicants to fill
those 42 spaces. Those 80 rejected applicants bore the entire
displacement burden of affirmative action at the Michigan Law
School in 2000. Their rejection allowed about 400 incoming
students at the Law School to partake in a diverse learning
environment.80
With 91% of the Law School’s students reporting favorably
about diversity in the Gallup survey, we can deduce the number
of self-reported beneficiaries to be about 360. By this count, the
actual beneficiaries were four and a half times as numerous as
the actual burden-bearers (360:80). 81 The 80 or so would-be
admits comprised just 3.7% of the 2,183 applicants rejected by
76. William Bowen and Derek Bok call the assisted minority admitted
students “retrospectively rejected” admits. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK,
THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 18 (1999); see also Goodwin Liu, The
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002).
77. The displacement burden discussed in this article is distinct from
other burdens, such as the burdens of stigmatization and mismatch, which are
felt by the underrepresented minority students. See infra note 167.
78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241).
79. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(noting that most competitive underrepresented minority applicants are also
highly recruited by other selective schools); Liu, supra note 76, at 1075, 1106
(discussing data from Bowen and Bok’s study).
80. In the early 2000s, the Michigan Law School enrolled about 400 JD
students each year. See Enrollment Reports - 113: Graduate-Professional
Enrollment by School or College, Class Level and Gender, OFFICE OF THE
REGISTRAR,
UNIV.
OF
MICH.,
http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/enrollment.php?limit=none#r113 (last visited
May 31, 2015).
81. See Orfield & Whitla, supra note 52, at 160.
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the Law School, which means the overwhelming majority of the
rejected applicants was not affected by affirmative action. 82
They would not have been admitted even if the admissions
review process had been race-blind since those 42 places would
have been filled by the would-be admits ahead of them.
Yet many rejected applicants are unaware of this fact
because Michigan Law School, like all other schools with the
Grutter regime, does not distinguish the would-be admits from
other rejected applicants.83 Many in the latter group also have
superior applicant credentials than some of the race-plus admits
and could reasonably believe that their admissions outcomes
were adversely affected by affirmative action. 84 Since they
would not have been admitted irrespective of racial preferences,
their belief of having been burdened is misguided and they are
the “false burden-bearers.”
The false burden-bearers among the 2,183 rejected
applicants could easily outnumber the 360 actual beneficiaries
and even invert the favorable ratio of beneficiaries to would-be
admits. The misplaced belief of being harmed by racial
preferences (the “false victim effect”) helps to account for why
anti-affirmative action initiatives receive strong voter support.85
The growth of applications at selective schools can exacerbate
the false victim effect even as the underlying scale of the raceconscious admissions program remains unchanged. From 1997
to 2005, the number of applications Michigan Law School
received grew from 3,429 to 5,523,86 and the number of rejected
82. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1095.
83. Goodwin Liu refers to this reaction as legitimizing “the instinct –
against all odds – to blame affirmative action.” See id. at 1060.
84. In response to arguments that there is “overwhelming support by the
students at Harvard and University of Michigan’s Law Schools for maintaining
the diversity program,” Justice Scalia noted that the people to talk to are “the
high school seniors who have seen . . . people visibly less qualified than they
are get into prestigious institutions where they are rejected. If you think that
is not creating resentment, you are just wrong.” See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 51-52, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
85. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1050 (“Claims of displacement tend to
inflate the degree of racial conflict inherent in race-conscious admissions,
thereby heightening the pressure to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ affirmative action.”).
86. For the University of Michigan Law School’s Admissions page from
March 8, 2005, see Admissions: About the School, U. MICH. L. SCH.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20050308020909/http://www.law.umich.edu/prosp
ectivestudents/admissions/index.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
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applicants doubled to 4,400. 87 The number of false-burden
bearers can rise sharply, irrespective of how many applicants
are actually displaced.88
Thomas Kane calls the false victim effect the “perceived
cost” of affirmative action.89 Writing in 1998, he predicted that
when the “pedagogical benefits racial diversity produced on
campus are being compared with a perceived cost that is likely
to be exaggerated . . . the political process is likely to
underprovide diversity on campus.”90 If the public had a more
accurate accounting of the beneficiaries and actual burdenbearers, then diversity through affirmative action ought to be a
consistent electoral winner rather than a political liability.
Supporters of affirmative action, in their effort to explain
the unlikelihood of being burdened by race-based preferences,
have unwittingly contributed to the false victim effect. Derek
Bok points out that empty handicap spaces in a crowded parking
lot may tempt drivers, but without the handicap sign, the spaces
would not be empty.91 Similarly, he reasons, the chance that a
typical rejected applicant of getting admitted to the seat taken
by a race-plus admit is “vanishingly small” because there are
many other even more competitive rejected applicants. In her
dissent in Gratz, Justice Ginsberg cites Goodwin Liu who
explains that race-conscious programs do not “unduly constrict”
admissions opportunities for students of non-favored groups,
because at selective schools “where applicants greatly
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 383-85 tbl. 1-3 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
88. At Michigan Law School, as with most selective schools, the size of the
enrolled class and the critical mass of minority students therein fluctuate
slightly from year to year so the ratio of actual beneficiaries to burden-bearers
(would-be admits) should also remain stable. For annual Law School
enrollment data, see supra note 80. For ethnicity data, see Ethnicity Reports 836G: Graduate Enrollment by School or College, Ethnicity, Class Level and
Gender with Rackham Students Assigned According to Field of Specialization,
OFFICE
OF
THE
REGISTRAR,
UNIV.
OF
MICH.,
available
at
http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/ethnicity.php?limit=none#r836G (last visited
May 31, 2015). See also id.
89. Kane, supra note 67, at 993.
90. Id.
91. On Air Interview with Derek Bok, Harvard Univ., on PBS Frontline:
Secrets
of
the
SATs
(1999),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/interviews/bok.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2015).
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outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly
outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for
minority applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of
admission facing white applicants.” 92 Such characterizations
attempt to reduce the magnitude of the burden through
probabilistic terms but also spread the burden much more
widely.
When Bok and William Bowen say the elimination of
affirmative action would increase the chances of white students
to gain admission very slightly, from 25% to 26.5%, they imply
that every applicant of a non-favored race is in fact burdened by
racial preferences, but only by a little.93 This argument supports
the Grutter majority’s view that the Grutter regime “does not
unduly harm nonminority applicants,” but is unlikely to
persuade to disappointed applicants and their sympathizers.94
For the actually displaced, the impact of race-plus
preference on their odds of admission was not 1.5% but 100%.
Even Liu’s careful study concludes that there are applicants who
are in fact displaced by affirmative action and can legitimately
claim to have been burdened.95 Since these would-be admits are
not known, a much larger set of the rejected pool can claim to be
harmed.96 Hence, the more broadly the burden of affirmative
92 . See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 768 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Clay, J., concurring) (discussing Goodwin Liu’s study and concluding that “‘the
Barbara Grutters of our society’ have no reason to claim that anything has
been ‘taken’ from them by virtue of the law school’s admission policy.”); Liu,
supra note 76, at 1049.
93. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003), (No. 02-241) (counsel for respondents indicating that eliminating
racial preferences would have increased the chance of other applicant
admissions by approximately five percent).
94. See id. at 53 (counsel for respondents describing the displacement
effect of affirmative action as “a very small and diffuse burden.”); BOWEN &
BOK, supra note 76, at 26, 36.
95. Liu, supra note 76, at 1050, 1092.
96. In making this appeal against affirmative action, Roger Clegg casts
the burdens of race-based preferences broadly:
Considering [that] over 3,500 individual nonblack students
were rejected [at four public university medical schools over
a two-year period] despite having better MCAT scores and
undergraduate grades than the median black students
accepted. Multiply this by the number of medical schools in
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action is said to be distributed, the greater numbers of no votes
will be drawn against affirmative action on Election Day. For
supporters of affirmative action, it is preferable to confine the
burden-bearers to their actual numbers than to inflate the false
burden effect.97
3. Lack of Progress Toward the Narrowing of the
Achievement Gap
Grutter calls for reducing and eventually eliminating the
need for affirmative action in admissions, but made no effort to
monitor progress on this front or assess the efficacy of the
schools’ efforts toward this goal. More than a decade onward,
the schools have disclosed scarcely little about how their
programs are working and the public sees few signs of progress
in achievement gap.
The Court did not impose any oversight requirement on the
schools practicing the Grutter program when it easily could have
done so.98 Having granted schools a 25-year period in which to
operate conforming affirmative action programs, it would not
have been onerous to require the schools to report, for example,
the number of times in each application cycle the race-plus factor
was used. The schools, having been shielded from legal
the country . . . and multiply that times all the years that
these preferences have been awarded — and you [have to]
conclude that there have been a lot of victims of
discrimination.
Roger Clegg, Bad Medicine, Coast to Coast: What Quotas Do to Education,
NAT’L
REV.
ONLINE
(June
14,
2001),
http://web.archive.org/web/20120924123136/http://old.nationalreview.com/con
tributors/clegg061401.shtml. See also Thomas Kane, The Long Road to Race
Blindness,
SCIENCE,
Oct.
24,
2003,
available
at
http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_issues/article
s/2003_10_31/nodoi.17412015748349963458 (“A large fraction of [rejected
applicants] may well believe that they would have been accepted if Harvard
had no racial preferences.”).
97. Also, a school has greater control over which applicants it accepts than
which and how many applicants choose to apply.
98. Affirmative action programs designed to remedy past discrimination
are generally “subject to continuing oversight” to ensure that they “work the
least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.”
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
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challenges, would have little to lose by disclosing this statistic.
Since schools must review each application individually, they
can readily tabulate how many minority applicants they admit
each year with and without the race-plus factor.
Race-plus usage figures would give the public a much better
picture of the scale of affirmative action in higher education.99
Actual race-plus usage statistics can help dispel the false victim
effect and gauge efforts to narrow the achievement gap.
Comparisons could be made across schools and over time. The
absence of any such disclosure combined with indirect evidence
that the achievement gap remains unchanged undermines
public confidence in the ability of the Grutter regime to work as
the Supreme Court had intended.
The gaps in college entrance exam scores across racial
groups remain largely unchanged in the decade since Grutter.
On the SAT-I reasoning test, the average scores of Native
American, Hispanic and black students in 2003 were,
respectively, 101, 151 and 206 points below that of white
students, who averaged 1063 on the 1600-point math and verbal
sections.100 In 2014, those gaps were, respectively, 96, 153 and
203 points. 101 The absolute scores of these underrepresented
minority groups show negligible improvement. In those eleven
years, black students gained three points, Native American
students fell by five points, and Hispanic scores fell by two
points. 102 The only racial group to show sustained gains is
Asian-American, a racial minority that is generally not
considered underrepresented in higher education.
AsianAmerican students outscored white students by 20 points on the
SAT-I in 2003 and 58 points in 2014 (1121 vs. 1063).103

99. Cf. William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates Built-In
Headwinds: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 131, 204-05 & nn. 310-12 (2002) (on the need for better data).
100. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying note.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Figure 1: SAT Reasoning & Math Scores by Race/Ethnicity
(1992-2013)104
Mean SAT scores by race and ethnicity 1992-2014
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The American Achievement Test (ACT), unlike the SAT, is
a more knowledge-based exam that is less susceptible to
criticisms of testing bias, but the trendlines in the achievement
gap are the same. In 2003, on the ACT, Native American,
Hispanic and black students scored respectively, 3.0, 3.2 and 4.8
points below white students who averaged 21.7 on the 36-point

104 . Source Data: COLLEGEBOARD, COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS TOTAL
GROUP PROFILE REPORT, COLLEGE BOARD (1992-2014). Explanatory notes for
the SAT-I data: (a) The College Board presents Hispanic student scores in
three sub-groups: Mexican-American, Puerto Rican and Other Latino and the
Hispanic data points in this graph are based on weighted averages of these
sub-groups. (b) This graph does not show the scores of those students
categorized as “Other” or “No Response” by the College Board. (c) The
noticeable dip in the mean score of all students from 2005 (1028) to 2006 (1007)
was driven in large part by a sharp decline in the scores of students who
declined to self-report their race/ethnicity. The percentage such test-takers
rose from 7.9% in 1992 to 25.3% in 2003 and fell to 3.8% in 2013. (d) The 1992
SAT-I scores are reported based on the re-centered scale set by the College
Board in 1995.
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scale.105 By 2014, those same gaps had widened, respectively, to
4.3, 3.5 and 5.3 points.106 Over those 11 years, the ACT scores
of Hispanic students rose by 0.3 points, those of black students
gained one-tenth of a point, and Native American student scores
Asian-American students showed
fell by 0.7 points. 107
noticeable improvement; their mean score overtook that of white
students for the first time in 2003 and improved by 1.7 points to
23.5 in 2014.108
Figure 2: ACT Composite Scores by Race/Ethnicity (19972014)109
ACT composite scores by race / ethnicity 1997-2014
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105. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying note.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. ACT, PROFILE REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2014), available at www.act.org/newsroom/data/2014/pdf/profile/Section1.pdf;
ACT, PROFILE REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009),
available at www.act.org/newsroom/data/2009/pdf/one.pdf; ACT, PROFILE
REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), available at
http://www.act.org/newsroom/data/2007/pdf/one.pdf; ACT, PROFILE REPORT –
NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2006), available at
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The conspicuous score gaps at the national level are even
more pronounced among applicants to selective schools. Thomas
Espenshade and Alexandra Radford’s study of 1997 admissions
statistics from selective private schools found the race-plus boost
for black applicants were equal to 310 points on the SAT-I
compared to whites. 110 Hispanic applicants enjoy a smaller
boost of 130 points while Asian-Americans had to outscore their
white counterparts by an average of 140 points to have the same
chance to be admitted. 111 A study of Duke University
admissions statistics from 2001 and 2002 found Asian American
students who enrolled averaged 1457 on the SAT-I, compared to
1416 for white, 1347 for Hispanic and 1275 for black students.112
Asian-Americans, who are often admitted at lower rates than
whites by selective schools, have begun to challenge this “raceminus” treatment.113
The depth and persistence of the achievement gap suggests
that selective schools are failing the acid test. 114 Their racehttp://www.act.org/newsroom/data/2006/pdf/one.pdf.
110. See Thomas J. Espenshade & Alexandria Walton Radford, A New
Manhattan
Project,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Nov.
12,
2009),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2009/11/12/radford (providing a review
on THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER
SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND
CAMPUS LIFE (1999)).
111. Id.
112. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., What Happens After Enrollment? An
Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice, IZA
J. LAB. ECON. 1, 34 (2012). For a data set description, see ANITA-YVONNE
BRYANT ET AL., DUKE UNIV., THE CAMPUS LIFE AND LEARNING PROJECT: A
REPORT ON THE FIRST TWO COLLEGE YEARS 8 (2006).
113. See, e.g., Michael Wang, Asian-Americans and SCA-5: Here’s Why
Many Oppose It, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 17, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26159971/asian-americans-and-sca5-heres-why-many; Amanda Paulson, Why Are Asian Students Suing Harvard
for Affirmative Action Policies? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2014/1118/Why-are-Asianstudents-suing-Harvard-for-affirmative-action-policies-video.
114. For the persistence of score gaps on graduate school admissions tests,
see AAMC, USING MCAT DATA IN MEDICAL STUDENT SELECTION 2 (2013); LSAC,
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL: LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT 12-03 27 (2012);
SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO ET AL., LSAC, LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL,
GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 2005–2006 THROUGH 2011–2012
TESTING YEARS (2012); The Widening Racial Scoring Gap on Standardized
Tests for Admission to Graduate School, J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. (2006),
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/51_graduate_admissions_test.html
(last
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conscious admissions programs have not brought about
noticeable improvements in academic performance of
underrepresented minority students nationally, and there is
little evidence that they have become less dependent on the raceplus factor to create diversity on campus. These developments
give additional motivation to affirmative action’s critics, who are
convincing the public that the use of race in admissions will not
diminish naturally and must be voted down.115
4. Implicit Race Norming Effect
The stubborn persistence of the achievement gap also fuels
criticism that race-conscious admissions programs are
perpetuating instead of addressing the problem. By admitting
some underrepresented minority applicants at lower admissions
thresholds, selective schools are said to diminish the incentive of
these students to score higher. The practice of race-norming in
employment or comparing and evaluating job candidates only
among members of that candidate’s racial group is prohibited by
the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 116 What many selective schools
have apparently done is to admit a nearly-fixed quantum of top
applicants from each race, irrespective of whether some of the
top applicants of one race or ethnic group are competitive with
the rejected candidates of another group.117 Justice Thomas, in
visited May 31, 2015).
115. See David Savage, Affirmative Action Case Splits Asian Americans,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/30/nation/naaffirm30; Scott Jaschik, Too Asian?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 10, 2006),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/10/asian.
116 . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2012) (prohibiting the “use [of] different
cutoffs scores for . . . employment related tests on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”).
117 . Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his Grutter dissent, observed that
applicants of different racial groups who had similar grades and test scores
were admitted at different rates. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 382 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The notable gains in Asian American test scores
in the face of overall score stagnation over the past decade and the “race-minus
factor” of 140 points that Asian American applicants reportedly face at certain
selective schools also support the implicit race-norming hypothesis. When
Asian American applicants are compared against each other by the admissions
committees, they are pressed to outscore members of their own racial group
and driven to improve their academic credentials irrespective of how their nonAsian peers perform. See Ethan Bonner, Asian-Americans in the Argument,
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his dissent, explains how the practice can dent incentives for
higher minority achievement and allow different groups to settle
into different score thresholds:
An applicant’s LSAT score can improve
dramatically with preparation, but such
preparation [carry] a cost, and there must be
sufficient benefits attached to an improved score
to justify additional study. Whites scoring
between 163 and 167 on the LSAT are routinely
rejected by the [Michigan] Law School, and thus
whites aspiring to admission at the Law School
have every incentive to improve their score to
levels above that range. [Noting that in 2000, 209
out of 422 whites were rejected in this range.]
Blacks, on the other hand, were nearly
guaranteed admission if they score above 155.
[Noting that in 2000, 63 out of 77 black applicants
were accepted with LSAT scores above 155.] As
admission prospects approach certainty, there is
no incentive for the black applicant to continue to
prepare for the LSAT once he is reasonably
assured of achieving the requisite score.118
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/education/edlife/affirmative-action-acomplicated-issue-for-asian-americans.html?_r=0
(quoting
a
former
admissions officer at Wesleyan, Brown and Columbia: “The bar is different for
every group.”) For example, a score of 600 on the SAT-I math section ranks at
the 75th percentile among all test-takers and would place at the 94th
percentile among black students, 91th among Mexican-Americans, 90th among
Puerto Ricans, 89th among other Hispanics, 85th among Native Americans,
and 71st among whites, but only 46th among Asian-Americans. See COLLEGE
BOARD, SAT PERCENTILE RANKS 2014 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS -- CRITICAL
READING, MATHEMATICS, AND WRITING PERCENTILE RANKS (2014), available at
https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/sat-percentileranks-crit-reading-math-writing-2014.pdf; COLLEGE BOARD, SAT PERCENTILE
RANKS FOR 2014 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: CRITICAL READING, MATHEMATICS,
AND WRITING PERCENTILE RANKS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2014),
available at https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/satpercentile-ranks-gender-ethnicity-2014.pdf. Thus, when a score that is better
than three-quarters of the field is nevertheless below the median for one racial
group, race norming can create uneven incentives for individuals, and lead to
greater disparity in outcomes across racial groups.
118. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas qualifies his statement somewhat by noting that
it is uncertain whether the test-taker’s behavior is responsive to
admissions policies, but his point holds a degree of intuitive
appeal and may draw on anecdotal support.119
The very notable shortage of high scoring black students on
admissions tests is difficult to explain with historical or socioeconomic factors. In 2003, some 1,877 black students scored
1300 or higher on the SAT-I, accounting for just 1.5% of all black
students who took the test.120 This ratio is well below the 10%
of all scores above 1300, achieved by 148,024 test takers.121 Out
of the 13,897 who scored above 1500, only 72 were black
students.122 The 192 black students with 1450 or better SAT
scores could comprise the critical mass at just one selective
school.123
Given the scarcity of high scoring black students, selective
colleges must inevitably admit others with lower scores, who
still rank near the top of the black applicant pool. With their
chances for admission already very high, the students of this
second tier have few reasons to improve their credentials
further. After all, there is no difference in admissions outcome
between a race-plus admit and an unassisted minority admit.
Both get in. The regime upheld in Grutter presents no incentives
for schools to convert the former into the latter.
119. At the Grutter trial, Jay Rosner, a director of the Princeton Review
Foundation, testified that minorities are often unaware of the benefits of test
preparation services and enroll in much smaller numbers than whites. Rosner
had trouble filling a 15-seat LSAT preparation course at Howard University, a
predominantly black institution, even though the course fee was discounted
from the customary $1,000 to $200. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,
861 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
120. Michael Dobbs, At Colleges, an Affirmative Reaction: After Rulings,
Recruiters Take a More Inclusive Approach to Diversity, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
2003, at A01.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. When Grutter was decided in 2003, Harvard College, whose
admissions plan had been so influential to Justice Powell, accepted 200 black
students into its Class of 2007. See Class of ‘07 Selected from Pool of Over
20,000: Considered the Most Competitive in Harvard’s History, HARV. GAZETTE
(Apr.
3,
2003),
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/04.03/01admissions.html.
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Whether the lack of incentives to boost minority high scores
actually perpetuates the achievement gap is often lost in the fray
of the public political debate. On the eve of Proposal 2 vote in
Michigan, the Center for Equal Opportunity, an anti-affirmative
action organization, reported that the median SAT-I scores of
black students admitted to the University of Michigan’s main
undergraduate college in 2005 was 1160, compared to 1260 for
Hispanics, 1350 for whites and 1400 for Asian-Americans.124 As
with other contested issues in this debate, the shift in venue
from litigation to political referendum has effectively reversed
the burden of proof. Instead of opponents of affirmative action
having to prove their doubts in a court of law, supporters must
work to disprove or dispel the doubt in the public mind. The
current Grutter regime is poorly designed to respond to the
charge of race-norming.
C.

Addressing Grutter’s Shortcomings

Affirmative action’s supporters can ill-afford to stand
behind Grutter and ignore the opponents’ reasoned and
unreasoned criticism. They must address Grutter’s weaknesses
and modify the regime to save it from the onslaught of ballot
initiatives and renewed litigation. They must put forward a
stronger and more convincing showing of diversity’s benefits to
the broader public. They can no longer dismiss the grievances
of those claiming to be burdened by affirmative action, but
should seek to accommodate those actually burdened. Just as a
distinction should be made between real and false burdenbearers, so too should the unassisted minority admits be
distinguished from the race-plus admits. The admissions
process should provide incentives for the latter to improve their
credentials and join the ranks of the former. Only then can a
race-conscious admissions system begin to satisfy the acid test
of the Grutter majority and work to narrow the achievement gap.
As increasing numbers of minority applicants become
competitive with the rest of the admitted applicant pool, the
practice of race norming will disappear.
124. Scott Jaschik, New Salvos on Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/17/mich.
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Two keys are critical to correcting the flaws of Grutter. The
first is disclosure of the frequency of race-plus usage, which
would reveal the limited scale of race-based admissions
preferences and provide a means for public oversight. 125 The
second is a workable mechanism that can be used to
accommodate the would-be admits or otherwise address their
concerns. When the public is informed of the true extent of
affirmative action in higher education and is assured that those
actually burdened by the race-based preferences are
accommodated, the false burden-bearer effect will dissipate.
Disclosing race-plus statistics is relatively straightforward,
but accommodating the burden-bearers requires a closer
accounting of the benefits of diversity against the burdens of
affirmative action. Grutter’s rough cost-benefit analysis, which
broadly endorsed the claimed benefits of diversity and generally
dismissed the burdens complained by the critics, is plainly
inadequate. It inflamed the critics and deprived supporters of
the proof they need in the political arena.
IV.
A.

Benefits and Burdens

Benefits

According to various social science studies, students who
interact in and outside the classroom with peers of diverse
backgrounds show greater active thinking, intellectual growth
and respect for group differences than those who do not. 126
125 . See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow
Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 580 (2007) (calling for
greater transparency in the way affirmative action programs operate so the
public is better informed).
126. See EMILY J. SHAW, COLLEGEBOARD, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 2005-4:
RESEARCHING THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY 7, 11 (2005), available
at
https://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012/7/
researchreport-2005-4-researching-educational-benefits-diversity.pdf.
A
survey of undergraduates at 349 institutions found that students at liberal arts
colleges are more likely to engage in diversity-related activities, and that these
students were also more likely to take on greater academic challenges, engage
in collaborative learning activities, and report greater personal growth and
satisfaction in their college experience. Id. at 10-11(study of 1,258 engineering
students finding students in racially-diverse classrooms reported slightly
higher but significant gains in their group-problem solving abilities); see also
Paul D. Umbach & George D. Kuh, Student Experiences with Diversity at
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These can habits help prepare them to live, work, and lead in a
diverse and multifaceted world.127 The Grutter majority agreed
that these benefits then redound to the greater good of the
country, but Justices Scalia and Thomas were among those
unconvinced and critical of the majority’s deferential acceptance
of the Law School and amici’s description of diversity’s benefits.
To Justice Scalia, the benefits are akin to kindergarten
lessons in getting along, which are unworthy of special
government endorsement. 128 For many young Americans,
however, college or graduate school is their first opportunity to
have meaningful interactions with members of another race or
ethnicity.129 Justice Thomas ridicules elite schools for following
a “faddish slogan of the cognoscenti” to achieve a certain
classroom “aesthetic” with students of different color.130 He is
partially right – the mere diversity of students on campus, or
“structural diversity,” is necessary but not sufficient to create
educational benefits. 131
There needs to be meaningful
interaction among students and engagement by faculty to
expand educational possibilities, stimulate critical thinking, and
increase awareness of biases. 132 Only then could campus
diversity begin to advance the students’ cognitive and personal
Liberal Arts Colleges: Another Claim for Distinctiveness, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC.
169 (2006).
127. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“Major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”); id. at 331 (“high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military assert that . . . a ‘highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security.’” (citing Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516)).
128. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in judgment).
129. The survey of Harvard and University of San Francisco medical
students found that half did not have any meaningful contact with members of
another race prior to college, but two-thirds did during college and 85% did in
medical school. See Whitla et al., supra note 62, at 460.
130. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350, 354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in judgment).
131. See SHAW, supra note 126, at 4.
132. See Matthew J. Mayhew & Heidi E. Grunwald, Factors Contributing
to Faculty Incorporation of Diversity-Related Course Content, 77 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 148 (2006) (examining how 336 faculty members incorporated diversityrelated content into their teaching).
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growth and generate the kind of educational benefits that the
Grutter majority found valuable.
The litany studies offers glimpses of diversity at work, but
there is no demonstration that every school with student body
diversity is realizing diversity’s education potential. 133 The
difficulty in assessing how much educational benefits are being
produced prevents meaningful comparisons of race-conscious
and race-neutral means to achieve diversity, the central
conundrum in Fisher.
B.

Race Neutral Alternatives and Fisher

For any affirmative action program to withstand judicial
scrutiny, a state actor must show that the program is necessary
to achieve the government’s compelling interest.134 Necessity is
determined by comparing how well a race-neutral program
would perform to meet the same interest. 135 The Grutter
majority required schools to consider race-neutral means to
generate the educational benefits of diversity, but was satisfied
that none could do so “about as well” as Michigan Law School’s
holistic review with the race-plus factor. 136
The Court
considered this issue again ten years later in Fisher, and
tightened the standard by requiring the schools to show that no
“workable race-neutral alternatives” exist.137
Among the most commonly considered race-neutral
alternatives are socio-economic affirmative action and the socalled percent plans.138 The former, which provides preferences
133. Some within elite academic institutions are skeptical of the benefits
of diversity. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction, AM. PROSPECT,
(Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.prospect.org/article/affirmative-reaction (noting
that many who defend affirmative action for the sake of diversity are actually
motivated by their commitment to social justice and would do so “even if social
science demonstrated unconvertible that diversity (or its absence) has no effect
(or even a negative effect) on the learning environment.”).
134. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013); Grutter, 539
U.S. at 326; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978).
135. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40.
136. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)).
137. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414.
138 . See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY
FOUND., A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED
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on the basis of family income instead of race, has attracted
growing public interest in recent years, but remains unproven
as a stand-alone alternative because the achievement gap
extends to lower income levels. 139 The latter has been
implemented in Florida, Texas and California, and guarantees
students who graduate in the top n percent of their high school
class admission to their state’s flagship universities. 140 The
Grutter majority was persuaded that the “percent plans” could
not produce the same quality of educational benefits because
they constrained the schools’ academic selectivity or its ability
to choose students for their potential to contribute to campus
ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES 11-25 (2012), available at
https://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf; Richard D. Kahlenberg, A New
Affirmative Action Based On Class: Column, Supreme Court Ruling Opens
Door to More Appropriate Approach, USA TODAY (June 25, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/24/richard-kahlenberg-oncourt-and-affirmative-action/2452375/.
139. Whites and Asian-Americans from lower income brackets have on
average outscored black test-takers from the highest income brackets. See
JBHE Found., Inc., News and Views: Why Family Income Differences Don’t
Explain the Racial Gap in SAT Scores, 20 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 6 (1998);
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Deal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 989-90 (1996). In order to admit sufficient
minority students under a race-blind class-conscious system to achieve
existing “critical mass” levels, many schools would have to subject many more
seats in the admitted class to low-income preferences. See Kane, supra note
67, at 992. Kane found that blacks and Hispanics constituted only one out of
every six high-scoring, low-income students, and so every race-plus preference
replaced by “low-income plus” preference will, on average, yield one-sixth of a
minority student. Id. To maintain critical mass levels of minority students, a
school would have to expand the number of seats subject to the plus-factor by
a factor of six. Id. While this change may help low-income students overall, it
will displace large numbers of high-scoring, highly competitive middle and
upper middle-class students, minorities among them. Thus, the crux of the
matter remains the dearth of competitive underrepresented minority
applicants. Until their numbers grow sufficiently, schools will have difficulty
finding any race-neutral category in which they are, but not a small minority.
See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law
School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997) (concluding that
using racial-neutral proxies, such as socioeconomic status, would not yield
meaningfully diverse classes).
140 . For the development of percent plans in Texas, Florida, and
California, see Race-Neutral Alternatives in Postsecondary Education:
Innovative Approaches to Diversity, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 2003),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edliteraceneutralreport.html#_ftn63.
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diversity.141 The Justices urged schools to continue searching
for racial-neutral alternatives in preparation of affirmative
action’s eventual sunset, but left for the schools to decide when
they were ready to switch.142
In Texas, where affirmative action was banned in 1995 by
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood and the state legislature enacted
the Top 10% Law in 1997, Grutter allowed schools to reinstitute
race-conscious admissions policies.143 The University of Texas
at Austin (“UT-Austin”) added a race-conscious track with
holistic individualized review modeled on Grutter to complement
its race-neutral percent plan track for undergraduate
admissions. 144 By 2008, the race-neutral track accounted for
81% of all Texas high school graduates enrolled in the freshman
class, with the remaining 19.1% admitted through the raceconscious track.145

141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. Justice Thomas equated selectivity with
elitism. Id. at 355-56. At UT-Austin, with the percent plan filling up to 86%
of the incoming class, the school was left with limited room to select other
students who were deemed vital to the education mission, including athletes.
Scott Jaschik, Texas Limits ‘10%’ Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 1,
2009), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/06/01/texas. In order to give
schools greater selectivity, the state legislature modified the law in 2009 to cap
enrollment based on the percent plan to 75% of in-state freshman. See Jennifer
R. Lloyd, UT Changes Admissions Guidelines For Top Students, HOUS. CHRON.
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/UTchanges-admissions-guidelines-for-top-students-3994871.php.
142. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43 (“We take the Law School at its word that
it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and
will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2013) (commonly known
as the “Top Ten Percent Rule”); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir.
1996). Some schools, including Texas A&M at College Station and the
University of Georgia, declined to reinstitute race-conscious admissions.
Nancy G. McDuff & Halley Potter, Ensuring Diversity under Race-Neutral
Admissions at the University of Georgia in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 124 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.) (2014); Ron Nissimov,
A&M Defies Trend, Will Drop Race as Admissions Factor, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec.
4, 2003), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1033586/posts.
144. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224-25 (5th Cir.
2011).
145. UNIV. TEX. AT AUSTIN, TOP 10%: REPORT 11 8-9, TBL. 2, 2B (2008),
available
at
www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588Report11.pdf.
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The Fisher plaintiffs challenged the necessity of UTAustin’s race-conscious review in the second track. Since
minority enrollment at UT-Austin under the percent plan had
rebounded to pre-Hopwood levels, they contend that no further
race-based preferences are needed to satisfy the government’s
compelling interest in diversity. 146 In the first appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, UT-Austin asserted that the underrepresented
minority students admitted through the race-neutral track were
unevenly distributed among the school’s several colleges such
that a large proportion of medium and small sized classes had
few or no minority students, and some minority students felt
isolated. 147 Judge Higginbotham, writing for the panel that
upheld the school’s policy, agreed that only with the selectivity
afforded by the race-conscious track could UT-Austin assemble
the kind of campus diversity that could deliver something closer
to the “full educational benefits of diversity.”148
By a 9-7 vote, the Fifth Circuit declined to rehear the case
en banc.149 In her dissent, Judge Jones criticized the panel for
allowing the school to justify its policy based on minority student
presence at the classroom level.150 Such a ruling rests on factual
conditions that change from one semester to the next, and
provides no standard to determine when the changes in
classroom composition would warrant a different outcome. 151
Moreover, on a racially-diverse campus, student interactions
146 . Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242. Under the race-neutral percent plan,
enrollment of underrepresented minority students eventually reached onefifth of the class at UT-Austin, returning to or, for some groups, exceeding preHopwood levels. Id. at 242-43.
147. Id. at 241 (“. . . although overall enrollment of minority students at
UT rose significantly between 1996 and 2002, the Fall 2002 schedule contained
more classes with zero or one African American or Hispanic students than had
the Fall 1996 Schedule”); id. at 240 (comparing higher enrollment of Hispanic
and black students at the Colleges for Social Work and Education to the
College of Business Administration).
148. Id. at 245.
149. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2012).
150. Id. at 307 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“Will classroom diversity ‘suffer’ in
areas like applied math, kinesiology, chemistry, Farsi, or hundreds of other
subjects if, by chance, few or no students of a certain race are enrolled?”).
151. The panel acknowledged that UT-Austin’s race-conscious admissions
track cannot be “blessed … in perpetuity” and compared the situation to voter
redistricting cases, which the court must periodically revisit. Fisher, 631 F.3d
at 246.
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and learning opportunities are not confined to the classroom, so
the absence of minority students in certain classes should not
necessarily mean that the government’s interest is frustrated.152
The Supreme Court, by a 6-2 margin, vacated the judgment
and remanded.153 Justice Kennedy, who authored the opinion,
faults the Fifth Circuit for too readily deferring to UT-Austin’s
claim of having considered race-neutral alternatives, and
ordered a more stringent “assess[ment] of whether [UT-Austin]
has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that its
admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the
educational benefits of diversity.”154 Justice Kennedy appears to
wish for the lower court to delve deeply into the mechanics of the
admissions process, as he had in Grutter, to make sure that what
is supposed to be an open-minded evaluation of each applicant’s
diversity contribution potential does not devolve into an exercise
of racial group balancing to hit pre-determined critical mass
targets.155
On remand, the same Fifth Circuit panel, by a 2-1 margin,
ruled against further evidence gathering and reaffirmed its
earlier conclusion with slightly different interpretation of the
same record.156 This time, Judge Higginbotham focused on the
rigidity of the race-neutral percent plan, which relies on de facto
racial segregation in Texas high schools to achieve diversity and
excludes talented students who are ranked just outside the
152 . Consider the explanation of counsel in Gratz regarding the
interaction that takes place at the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
college:
[o]n campus, these 18-year olds [(freshmen)] interact with
students very different from themselves in all sorts of ways,
not just race, not just ethnicity, but in all sorts of ways.
Students, I think as we know, learn a tremendous amount
from each other. Their education is much more than the
classroom. It’s in the dorm, it’s in the dining halls, it’s in the
coffee houses. It’s in the daytime. It’s in the nighttime. It’s all
the time.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-242).
153. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
154. Id. at 2421.
155. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
156. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g
denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014).
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percent cut-off.157 The race-conscious track with holistic review,
he concludes, is necessary for UT-Austin to “patch[] the holes”
left by the mechanical percent plan to “achieve diversity that
contributes to its mission.” 158 The fact that relatively few
underrepresented minority students are admitted through the
race-conscious track, in his view, indicates the selection
standards are competitive, rigorous, and tailored to find the
most qualified.159
Judge Garza, in his dissent, faults UT-Austin for failing to
explain how the means (the race-conscious track used to
assemble a critical mass of underrepresented minority students)
contributes to the ends (“obtaining the educational benefits of
diversity.”) 160 UT-Austin does not define critical mass in a
manner that permits meaningful judicial review, he points out,
and the school does not assess whether the diversity within the
large portion of the incoming class admitted through the percent
plan satisfies critical mass before engaging in race-conscious
review.161 Hence, there is no way for an outside adjudicator to
determine whether the race-neutral track alone would be
sufficient to produce the kind of educational benefits that the
state finds compelling.162
The relationship between “critical mass” and the
“educational benefits” is circular, because Grutter allows for
157. Id. at 650-54. In Gratz, Justice Ginsberg also criticized the percent
plans for relying “on continued racial segregation at the secondary school
level[,]” creating perverse incentives for “parents to keep their children in lowperforming segregated schools” and discouraging students “from taking
challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages.” Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see Julie B.
Cullen et al., Jockeying for Position: Strategic High School Choice Under Texas’
Top Ten Percent Plan 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16,663), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16663 (evidence of Texas
students strategically “trading down” to enroll in less rigorous high schools to
improve their chances of admission via the percent plan).
158. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657.
159. Id. at 656 (arguing that “holistic review’s low production of numbers
is its strength, not its weakness.”).
160. Id. at 662.
161. Id. at 669 (Garza, J., dissenting).
162. Nor does the school explain how applicants are reviewed for their
contribution to this critical mass. Id.; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing en banc) (Garza, J.,
dissenting).
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“critical mass [to be] defined by reference to the educational
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.” 163 In essence,
UT-Austin can use its output, the educational benefits, to justify
its input, critical mass achieved through race-conscious means.
Since the output cannot be measured or approximated, the input
needed to produce a given level of output also cannot be
specified. Thus, the benefits generated by the class assembled
through the race-neutral track alone and the additional benefits
gained from diversity supplemented from the race-conscious
track cannot be compared; the necessity of the latter is nearly
impossible to prove. Fisher will almost certainly return to the
Supreme Court, where the Justices may remand again for more
facts – perhaps forcing UT-Austin to disclose how it determines
critical mass and the details of how applicants are assessed in
its multi-factor holistic evaluation. But even so, judges would
still have trouble second-guessing the school’s assessment that
the race-conscious track produces more benefits than the raceneutral track alone.164
Instead of further scrutiny of the school’s educational
policies, the analysis could be simplified by looking not only at
the benefits but also at the costs. When the benefit of something
is hard to assess, it is often easier to ask whether it’s worth the
costs. Grutter itself uses a cost-benefit analysis, albeit a crude
one, to conclude that the educational benefits to diversity
outweigh the burdens on applicants. It would be more straight
forward to require UT-Austin to show that the extra benefits
created by the race-conscious track outweigh the burdens
imposed on the would-be admits who are displaced along this
track. So long as this relative inequality holds true, courts need
not be concerned about whether critical mass has been attained
or whether the “full” benefits of diversity has been realized.
Instead, the school must account for the cost, if any, of getting
the critical mass it desires.

163. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
164. As Justice Douglas noted in DeFunis v. Odegaard, “[c]ourts are not
educators [and] their expertise [in educational policy] is limited.” 416 U.S. 312,
344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Burdens

The controversy over affirmative action in admissions exists
not because of differing opinions about the educational benefits
of diversity, but because racial preferences benefit some
applicants at the expense of others. From DeFunis to Fisher,
virtually every lawsuit challenging affirmative action in higher
education has been brought by a rejected applicant claiming to
have been harmed.165 Never has a plaintiff been an admitted
student who complained that the benefits of campus diversity
were inadequate. 166 While the burden of displacement drives
lawsuits, courts have been preoccupied with the burden of
unequal treatment, a legal construct that may have outlived its
usefulness.167
The denial of equal treatment on the basis of race, also
known as the “inability to compete on an equal footing,” arises
from the quota context “[w]hen the government erects a barrier
that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain
165. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Lesage v.
Texas, 528 U.S. 18 (1999); DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 312; Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir.
2004); Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir.
2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996); Henson v. Univ. of
Ark., 519 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1975).
166. Other types of burdens attributed to affirmative action in higher
education, which are not raised by plaintiffs and which do not contribute to the
political backlash against affirmative action to the same extent as the
displacement burden, are not addressed in Part III, though the paradigm shift
proposed in the second half of this article works to ease at least two of these
types of burdens. The first is the burden of stigmatization that race-based
preferences in admissions may have on minority students of favored groups,
imbuing them with an inferiority complex in their own self-conception. See,
e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991);
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1990); see also infra Part V.A. The second is the burden of mismatch
on assisted minority admits, who are said to be admitted to schools that are
too rigorous for their abilities and are more likely to underperform, fail or drop
out. See, e.g., RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP AND WHY
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012); Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004); see
also infra Part VII.B.
167. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1079-80 (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 999
F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998)).
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a benefit than it is for members of another group.” 168 The
“imposition of the barrier” is itself the burden, “not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit.”169 So all applicants blocked by
the barrier are burdened, regardless of whether they would have
been admitted.170 In Bakke, Justice Powell tried to bridge the
difference between the displacement and unequal treatment
burdens, by assuming the position of an actually displaced
applicant and examining his treatment under the Harvard
Program:
The applicant who loses out on the last available
seat to another candidate receiving a “plus” on the
basis of ethnic background will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat
simply because he was not the right color or had
the wrong surname. It would mean only that his
combined qualifications, which may have included
similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh
those of the other applicant. His qualifications
would
have
been
weighed
fairly
and
competitively, and he would have no basis to
complain of unequal treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.171
Justice Powell’s reasoning, that an applicant who got a fair
review in the admissions review process cannot claim unequal
treatment even if he were displaced by the race-plus factor,
allows courts to prioritize the burden of unequal treatment
168. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 665 (1993); see also Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21.
169. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am, 508 U.S. at
665.
170. Allen Bakke could not prove that he would have been admitted to the
U.C. Davis Medical School had it not been for the school’s affirmative action
program, which set aside 16 of 100 places in the entering class for
underrepresented minority students. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279. Nor could the
defendant medical school prove that Bakke still would have been rejected
absent the set-aside program. Id. at 320. Hence, Bakke could not establish
standing to sue based on a displacement burden theory, and the courts, in
recognizing the unequal treatment burden, gave him another basis to assert
standing for the lawsuit. Id.
171. Id. at 317.
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above that of displacement. If the racially-disparate treatment
does not violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,
then any displacement that occurs as a consequence of the
unequal treatment could also be dismissed as a matter of law.172
This ruling gives any applicant who complains of unequal
treatment standing to sue regardless of whether he or she was
actually displaced, but if the court finds the preferential
treatment passes constitutional muster, any complaint about
displacement can be ignored.173
The Grutter majority followed this path.174 After deciding
that the benefits of diversity were compelling to the government
and noting that Michigan Law School’s admissions program
provided for holistic review along the same lines of the Harvard
Program, Justice O’Connor dispensed with concerns about
burdens by citing Justice Powell.175 In the Court’s view, so long
as the plaintiff got a fair shake in the admissions process, he or
she would have no basis to complain. Hence, the conclusion that
Michigan Law School’s “race-conscious admissions program does
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”176
Analyzing and disposing the burden question entirely
through the lens of unequal treatment is problematic for at least
three reasons. First, by ignoring the displacement burden, the
analysis does not address the grievances that motivate the
plaintiffs and their sympathizers, and make it more difficult for
them to accept the rationale of the case. Second, the unequal
treatment burden casts all applicants of non-favored racial
groups as bearing the burden and fuels the false victim effect.177
Third, the analysis no longer describes the reality of the raciallydisparate treatment in the race-plus context.
172. Id. at 316-18, 321.
173. Lesage v. Texas, 528 U.S. 18, 20 (1999) (permitting a plaintiff to seek
injunctive relief against “an ongoing race-conscious program” without having
to “affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race
were not considered” because “[t]he relevant injury in such cases is the
‘inability to compete on an equal footing.’”).
174. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (“Petitioner
clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit.”).
175. Id. at 341.
176. Id.
177. See supra Part III.B.2 (description of how racial preferences affect
admission probabilities versus outcomes).
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Having outlawed quotas and automatic point awards, the
Court has cut down the barrier to compete to such an extent that
the barrier is virtually gone, except for the race-plus factor.178 A
school treats applicants differently on the basis of their race only
when it gives the race-plus boost to favor one applicant at the
expense of another. Consider the following scenario from the
Harvard College Program cited by Justice Powell:
The Admissions Committee, with only a few
places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose
between A, the child of a successful black
physician in an academic community with
promise of superior academic performance, and B,
a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of
semi-literate
parents
whose
academic
achievement
was
lower
but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an
apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a
good number of black students much like A but
few like B had already been admitted, the
Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a
white student with extraordinary artistic talent,
were also seeking one of the remaining places, his
unique quality might give him an edge over both
A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often
individual qualities or experience not dependent
upon race but sometimes associated with it.179
If A had superior credentials to C, and A is admitted, then
A is an unassisted minority admit whose race did not help his
application. If A’s credentials were inferior or comparable to C’s
and A was given the race-plus boost over C, then A would be a
race-plus admit and C, having been displaced by unequal
treatment, a would-be admit. If B were admitted over C, it is
possible that the admissions officer used the race-plus factor, but
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) (counsel for respondents stating that “the record tells us . .
. 95 percent of all the admissions decisions that are made each year are not
affected by the consideration of race.”).
179. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978).
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if the school’s admissions policy permits giving a preference to
applicants whose parents were not well-educated, then that
could be the plus factor that put B above A and C, not race. If C
were admitted over A and B, the race-plus factor was not used
even if the race of all three applicants were considered.
Since only those who receive the benefit of the race-plus
boost are treated with a racial preference, only those displaced
as a consequence can be said to have been burdened by the
preference. Aside from race-plus admits and would-be admits,
the rest of the applicant pool is untouched by the race-plus factor
and cannot be said to have been “treated” unequally on the basis
of race. When our understanding of the unequal treatment
burden is updated to match the way the race-plus factor is used,
the two burdens become virtually the same. Addressing the
burden of affirmative action in terms of displacement would
answer the complaints more directly and dispel the false burden
effect.
Having clarified the burden and the burden-bearers, what
then is weight of their burden? According to the Justice Scalia,
the burden is onerous. “[N]onminority individuals who are
deprived of a legal education . . . by reason of their skin color,”
he says, bear the burden of Michigan Law School’s raceconscious admissions program.180 According to Liu, the burden
is light. He posits that the would-be admits by virtue of having
just missed the cut-off for admission are strong applicants who
are almost always accepted by other selective schools, and are
not deprived of schooling altogether. 181 The weight of the
displacement burden is the difference between the value of the
opportunity that the displaced applicant was deprived of and his
next best alternative. Liu concludes that the would-be admits
are fairly content with the school that they attend, and are not
the ones filing lawsuits.
However, the personal circumstances of each would-be
admit is unique. Barbara Grutter’s alternative was Wayne
State University Law School, a Tier III law school, which did not
have the health law program she sought to study, so she never
attended law school. We do not know if Grutter was a would-be
180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Liu, supra note 76, at 1093.

49

710

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:2

admit or a false-burden bearer. 182 Getting into a close
equivalent alternative school does not preclude an applicant
from feeling aggrieved. Jian Li, who filed a complaint with the
U.S. Department of Education against Princeton in 2006 for race
bias in admissions, had been admitted to Yale and transferred
to Harvard. 183 The question of how to deal with private
valuations of the burden will be addressed in Part V, in
conjunction with accommodation mechanisms.
D. Demoralization Costs
Like other social programs that reallocate opportunities to
promote net social gains, affirmative action creates burdens for
some individuals, and policymakers can leave the burdens
where they initially fall or compensate the burden-bearers to
ensure that no one is made worse off in the course of making
society better off. 184 To these two choices, Frank Michelman
added a third: burden-bearers should be compensated only when
it is more costly to ignore their burden.185 In his seminal study
of uncompensated property takings, Michelman explained that
when individuals believe that government action has deprived
them of benefits to which they have legitimate claims and leave
their losses unaddressed, they and their sympathizers may feel
demoralized.186 He observed that demoralized property-holders
will cut back on improvements to their property if they believe
their property could be taken without compensation, and society
182. Counsel for Bollinger contends that Grutter would not have been
admitted under a race-neutral policy, but concedes that the issue was not
litigated conclusively. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
183. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, New Challenge to Affirmative Action, INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.
(Nov.
14,
2006),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/14/princeton.
184. See ROBERT ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 65 (3d
ed. 2002) (comparing Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency models); William A.
Fischel & Perry Schapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on
Economic Interpretations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 269
(1988).
185. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1223
(1967); see also ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 498.
186. See Michelman, supra note 185, at 1215.
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would suffer from under-development of property. He called the
hidden cost of uncompensated government takings
demoralization costs.187
Getting rejected by colleges can be a demoralizing
experience. As Judge Garza notes, “It is no exaggeration to say
that the college application is 18 years in the making and is an
unusually personal experience: the application presents a
student’s best self in the hope that her sustained hard work and
experience to date will be rewarded with admission.” 188 The
preparations create great expectations, which compound the
rejected applicant’s sense of disappointment. 189 Applicants to
selective schools are unlikely to reduce their preparation even if
they may be burdened by affirmative action. Most students
apply with very limited advanced information about their
prospects.
The uncertainty of success and increasing
competition (which compounds the uncertainty) induce them to
over-apply, which leads to higher rates of rejections and greater
demoralization and more false burden-bearers.190
Compensation is not needed, according to Michelman, if a
social program distributes the burdens and benefits evenly or
over time such that the current burden-bearers may see a
benefit to themselves from the program in the future.191 To the
187. Id. at 1214.
188. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 265 (5th Cir.
2011) (Garza, J., concurring).
189. Supporters of affirmative action sometimes point to preferences for
children of alumni or athletes as other deviations from purely meritocratic
admissions norms, but those considerations do not trigger heightened
constitutional scrutiny and do not give rise to the same kind of political
backlash. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (colloquy between Justice Scalia and counsel for
respondents, agreeing that the Constitution does not preclude the disparate
treatment of oboe and flute players or the giving of legacy preferences to
children of alumni); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The Equal Protection Clause does not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly
legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures.”).
190. See, e.g., Daniel de Vise, For Georgetown Dean, Common Application
is Part of a Larger Admissions Problem, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2010 9:24 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/
AR2010092804421.html.
191. Michelman, supra note 185, at 1223 (giving Social Security and the
progressive income tax as examples of programs that do not to need
compensate those burdened).
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extent diversity in higher education benefits the entire society,
the displaced burden-bearers should also stand to benefit. But
since race and ethnicity are discrete qualities that individuals
cannot readily change, the aggrieved are more likely to regard
affirmative action as a continued risk to themselves and their
loved ones. 192 Their frustration and disappointment may lay
dormant but can manifest powerfully through the political
process, which is “underproviding” diversity in higher education.
Under Michelman’s model, compensation should be made
when it costs less to accommodate than to ignore. Based on the
analysis thus far, we know the educational benefits of diversity
are substantial, and the cost of ignoring the burden-bearers
(both actual and false) is getting to be prohibitive (i.e. legal bans
on affirmative action in eight states). The cost to accommodate
includes the weight of the displacement burden itself, which
compensation must offset, and transaction cost of reaching a
settlement with the burden bearers. The weight of the
displacement burden is not known but is believed to be light
though it may vary significantly across individuals. The
settlement process requires individuals to reveal their private
valuations. If a low-cost method of accommodation can be
devised, then accommodation should be made. Accommodation
mechanisms are examined in Part V. The next part explains
how the paradigm shift proposed in this article fits into the
existing legal and constitutional framework, and addresses
moral concerns.

192. See id. at nn.92, 95-96. When Jennifer Gratz was asked why she
continued to press her lawsuit after she had graduated from the University of
Michigan, she pointed to the next generation:
I think that the [affirmative action] policy is wrong. I mean,
I’ve watched other kids apply, I coached different sports in
high school, watched those kids apply to school, and one day
I’ll probably have kids of my own, and I think that people
should be treated fairly and equally and not treated
differently based on the color of their skin.
On Air Interview by Anderson Cooper with Jennifer Gratz, on CNN NewsNight
with
Aaron
Brown
(Dec.
2,
2002),
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/02/asb.00.html.
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Paradigm Shift

Property Rules, Liability Rules

The legal battle over affirmative action has been waged for
decades over competing entitlements to constitutional equal
protection: the applicant-plaintiffs’ right to race-neutral
admissions review versus the school-defendants’ right to
consider race in admissions.193 In each case, the court awarded
one side’s claim with what law and economic theorists call
property rule protection.194 A property rule protects a right or
entitlement with absolute legal protection. 195 Hopwood and
Wooden gave the plaintiffs’ claim to race-neutral treatment this
legal right of way and outlawed race-conscious admissions in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 196 Grutter reversed and granted
property rule protection to the schools’ entitlement to use the
race-plus factor for 25 years. Most laws are property rules. They
provide rigid, bright-line legal protection for recognized rights.
Property rules are supposed to bring finality to disputes, but
in cases where competing claims are closely-matched and
pursued by highly-motivated parties, the all-or-nothing nature
of property rule judgments can inflame the controversy. The
battle over affirmative action is so bitter that neither side is
willing to concede. The Gratz and Grutter plaintiffs, unwilling
to live with the Grutter ruling, threw their support behind
Proposal 2 and persuaded Michigan voters to write property rule
protection for race-neutral admissions into the state
constitution. 197 Pro-affirmative action groups spent the next
decade trying to overturn this enactment and restore the
property rule of Grutter until the High Court halted their efforts
in Schuette.
193. See cases cited supra note 165.
194. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 235-38; Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
195. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175,
2178-79 (1997).
196. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (11th
Cir. 2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing how Gratz and
Grutter launched the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative).
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Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed introduced liability
rules as the alternative to property rules to help the rule-maker
who is unable or unwilling to declare one side the absolute
winner over the other.198 A liability rule splits the decision of
which side should receive the law’s backing into two parts—the
legal entitlement and the option to transfer it to the other side
for a price. For example, a court may initially award the legal
right of way to Party A, but subject this right to an option given
to Party B. Party B, by exercising the option and paying Party
A a price, can obtain the law’s protection for its entitlement to
which Party A must then yield. Party B’s payment helps to
cushion Party A’s loss. By giving something to both sides,
liability rules reduce the likelihood that the parties will continue
their conflict.
Liability rules give rule-makers greater flexibility in
devising more balanced remedies. Calabresi and Melamed
introduced liability rules using call options, the option to
purchase/acquire. In the example above, Party B’s call option
allows him to acquire the legal right of way from Party A. 199
Liability rules can also use put options, the option to
sell/convey.200 Party A might receive both the legal right of way
and the option to convey it to Party B for a price. Party A decides
whether to keep the right or to sell it. Liability rules test how
much the parties value their claims by giving them choices
between the right and some sort of compensation, so the right
that is valued more gets the legal protection.
Altogether, the property and liability rules form a menu of
six basic ways for the rule-maker to devise legal remedies for
any dispute involving two parties.201 Not every rule is applicable
198 . See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 194, at 1006-09; see also
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 235-38.
199. Party B’s call option imposes a corresponding obligation on Party A
to sell or surrender the legal entitlement when the option is exercised. See
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 85456 (1993).
200. See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property Rights With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 793, 797-800 (1998); see also Ian Ayres & Jack M. Balkin, Legal
Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106
YALE L.J. 703 (1996).
201 . See Ian Ayres and Paul Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and
Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001)
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in every situation, but the menu can help the ruler-maker
rearrange and evaluate competing claims in creative ways to
arrive at the optimal outcome. Table 2 lays out how the six basic
rules would apply to a dispute between a school and a would-be
admit. The would-be admits are currently not known but they
could be readily identified by the admissions offices, which
maintain waiting lists and can most definitely use their
individualized review of applications to determine which
applicants would have been accepted. 202 Schools have been
reluctant to identify the would-be admits out of fear of litigation,
but may be willing to do so as part of an accommodation
arrangement that would shield them from liability.203

(showing “that there are an infinite number of rules . . . that produce identical
entitlement allocations, but which affect how the disputants divide the
entitlement’s value.”).
202 . Two of the accommodation mechanisms discussed below do not
require schools to inform the would-be admits. See discussion infra Part VI.
203 . Liability rules that clearly divide legal entitlements provide
incentives for parties to reveal private information. See Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
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Table 2: Settlement Outcomes under the Six Basic Rules204
Rule No.

Rule Type

School’s rights, options
and obligations

Rule 1

Property

Rule 3

Property

Rule 2

Liability
Call Option

Rule 4

Liability
Call Option

Rule 5

Liability
Put Option

Rule 6

Liability
Put Option

Right to use the race-plus
factor.
Obligation to accept the
would-be admit.
Obligation to accept the
would-be admit and option to
acquire her right (i.e. pay her
to be denied). If the school
exercises the option, it may
then use the race-plus factor.
Right to use the race-plus
factor subject to the would-be
admit’s option, which if
exercised, would obligate the
school to accept her. Her
payment would compensate
the school for loss of
diversity.
Obligation to accept the
would-be admit unless she
exercises her option, which
would obligate the school to
acquire her right (i.e. pay her
to be denied) and allow the
school to use the race-plus
factor.
Right to use the race-plus
factor and the option to
convey this right to the
would-be admit (i.e. have her
pay the school to accept her).
If the school exercises the
option, it would receive
compensation from her for
the loss of diversity.

Would-be admit’s
rights, options and
obligations
Obligation to accept
denial of admission.
Right to be admitted with
race-neutral review.
Right to be admitted
subject to the school’s
option, which if exercised,
would obligate her to
accept compensation for
the denial of admission.
Obligation to accept
denial of admission and
option to acquire the
school’s right (i.e. pay the
school to accept her). If
she exercises the option,
she would gain
admission.
Right to be admitted and
option to convey this right
to the school. If she
exercises the option, she
would accept
compensation to forego
admission.
Obligation to accept
denial of admission
unless the school
exercises its option, which
would obligate her to
acquire the school’s right
and gain admission.

The property rules (Rules 1 & 3) are already familiar. The
ruling majorities in Bakke, Grutter and Fisher and Colorado
voters in 2008 adopted Rule 1 to preserve affirmative action. Its
direct opposite, Rule 3, has been endorsed by judges in several
lower court decisions, voters in the other state ballot initiatives,
Governor Jeb Bush in Florida, and the New Hampshire
204. The rules are numbered based on the convention set forth in Ayres
& Goldbart, supra note 201, at 5-6.
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legislature. After Grutter sunsets in 2028, Rule 3 would become
the law of the land.
Three of the four liability rules have real world analogues.
The forced-buyout concept of Rule 2 resembles the proposed
admissions arrangement at issue in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada.205 In that pre-Brown v. Board case, the Supreme Court
rejected Missouri’s attempt to satisfy the requirement of
“separate but equal” by offering to pay black students to attend
out-of-state law schools to preserve segregation at an in-state
law school. The difference here is that this Rule 2 seeks to
promote racial diversity instead of racial segregation.206
Rule 4 describes the widespread if not unwritten practice in
higher education of wealthy patrons making large donations to
selective schools to reserve seats therein for their relatives or
designees.207 In these “buy-in” transactions, the school usually
sets high prices to benefit from the patrons’ high valuation of a
place in the admitted class. The donations can benefit the entire
campus, but admitting privileged applicants in this way also
displaces other applicants. Unlike affirmative action, disparate
treatment on the basis of donations is not constitutionally
suspect. Rule 4 discriminates on the ability to pay. Since schools
with affirmative action programs tend to possess greater
resources than the typical applicant, and since diversity is
presumed to be generating benefits for the school, it seems
unfair to ask the would-be burden-bearers to buy out the wouldbe beneficiaries.

205. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1938).
206. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241). Counsel for respondent stating:
[T]here is certainly a major difference between an
educational policy that is motivated by an intent to exclude
people based on racial animus and one like the Law School’s
policy and the Harvard Plan, which is designed to include
students of all races, so that the education of all students will
be enriched as a result.
Id.
207. See, e.g., Daniel Golden, How Much Does It Cost To Buy Admission?,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
26,
2003),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1047409881995483800.
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Airlines routinely use a Rule 5 arrangement to resolve the
problem of overbooked flights – by giving all passengers the
right to stay on the overbooked flight and an option for a seat on
a later flight plus a complementary ticket. Passengers who do
not mind departing later and want the free ticket will exercise
the option. No passenger is left aggrieved. By giving the
passenger both the initial right to fly and a put option, Rule 5
ensures that the passengers cannot be under-compensated. 208
Rule6 also has a put option but it is unnecessary to doubleprotect the school. Since a school that favor diversity will not
exercise its option and will keep its right to use race-plus factor,
Rule 6 turns into Rule 1.
Out of the four rules above, Rules 2 and 5 hold the most
intuitive appeal because they require the beneficiary to
compensate the burden-bearer, even though the two rules would
assign the initial right as well as the corresponding options to
opposite sides. In theory, when the cost of bargaining between
parties is low, the parties will arrive at the same optimal
outcome regardless of which rule is chosen.209 In this situation,
the cost of bargaining between one school and numerous wouldbe admits could be significant and our aim is to simplify the
bargaining process to lower the settlement cost. The price on
the options can have a strong impact on the bargaining process,
and will be addressed in Part VI.
B.

Constitutional Implications

Affirmative rights in the Constitution are thought of as
“inalienable” – so inviolable that they cannot be waived or
alienated by the individual – and generally protected by
property rules.210 A notable exception is the Fifth Amendment’s
208. Ayres, Protecting Property Rights with Puts, supra note 200, at 805.
209. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 722 (1996) (explaining
the Coase Theorem).
210. See Daniel A. Farber, Afterword: Property and Free Speech, 93 NW.
U. L. REV. 1239, 1253 (1999); Thomas Merrill, The Constitution and the
Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco
Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1152-53 (1999). Calabresi and Melamed
describe certain entitlements to be inalienable not in terms of constitutional
rules, but as the result of paternal or moral norms. Calabresi & Melamed,
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Takings Clause, which requires just compensation for
government takings of private property.211 The Takings Clause
is a classic liability rule, which gives the government the option
to take property but requires compensation for the property
owner. It compels the government to weigh the public benefit of
the taking against the cost of compensation. Calabresi says the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause can be
thought of in the same way as the Takings Clause. 212 The
transfer of resources and opportunities to members of
disadvantaged groups from individuals of non-favored groups
constitutes takings, he argues, for which compensation ought to
be paid because affirmative action as a policy vehicle to promote
substantive equality cannot be justified by intent alone. 213
Without compensation, “we often don’t know whether the taking
is worthwhile,” and “the less we charge those who benefit from
it, the easier it is [for them] to say [‘]we want the [benefit’],” he
cautions.214 Hence, affirmative action programs should pass a
“burden internalization test” by compensating those burdened to
ensure the benefits created are indeed worth the
redistribution. 215
Calabresi’s
concept
of
burden
internalization is drawn from Justice Scalia, who presumes
society is usually reluctant to pay for programs that benefit the
many at the expense of the few.216
supra note 194, at 1111-15.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
212. Guido Calabresi, Senior Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture at the Georgetown University Law
Center, Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution (Mar. 23, 2004),
available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/lawtheory-workshop/files/GCalabresi.pdf.
213. Id. Cf. Justice Oliver W. Holmes’s reminder not to “forget[] that a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the Constitutional way of paying for
the change.” Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
214. Calabresi, Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution, supra
note 212, at 9.
215. Calabresi asks, “Affirmative Action: who pays? Is giving a poor black
a job in the South something that a poor white steel worker in the South pays?
Or is it you and me? Very different. I think we have to give the poor black
steel worker a job. But it’s very easy to say that, if we are not the ones paying
for it.” Id. at 11.
216. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
Justice Scalia reasons that the Equal Protection Clause “requires the
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Burden internalization goes to the heart of this article’s
argument and is the breakthrough that can calm the controversy
over affirmative action in higher education and preserve the
benefits of diversity. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s presumption,
diversity’s benefits do in many if not most schools outweigh the
costs to the would-be admits, which should make burden
internalization attractive to supporters of affirmative action,
because it would offer a much stronger proof of diversity’s merits
and a stronger defense of race-conscious admissions, both in the
courtroom and forum of public opinion.
Constitutional law scholars are skeptical of efforts to
replace property with liability rule protection for constitutional
rights.217 But their criticism of this approach is betrayed by the
reality that cost-benefit analysis has already crept into the heart
of equal protection jurisprudence. Even before Grutter, the
Supreme Court was already taking the equal protection down
this path by converting the strict scrutiny review standard from
a most exacting constitutional inquiry into a cost-benefit
analysis that balances interests of the state against purportedly
inviolable rights of the individual.218 Indeed, the strict scrutiny
test itself, with an interest prong and a tailoring prong, has costbenefit balancing embedded in its structure. In each of Bakke,
Gratz and Grutter, the Justices used the interest prong to assess
the benefits created by state action, and then used the tailoring
prong to reduce the perceived burden on individuals of members
of non-favored groups.219
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones that which
they impose on you and me.” Id. (Scalia J., concurring). Calabresi says “we
must bear the burden, if we would [put the burden] on them.” Calabresi,
Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution, supra note 212, at 10
(emphasis added). See also Michelman, supra note 185, at 1169.
217 . See e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES nn. 112 &115 (1997) (contending that states are
permitted to “treat violations of sacred constitutional rights as merely the cost
of doing business.”).
218. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997).
219. In Grutter, counsel for respondents urged the Court to weigh the
burdens against the benefits. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (“[The burden of affirmative action]
is certainly something that the Court has to pay attention to, but this is
extremely limited in scope and relative to the benefits to students of all races
and to our Nation. It has to be weighed in the balance.”). See also Liu, supra
note 76, at 1061.
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The standard handed down from the affirmative action
cases, however, is difficult for lower courts to apply because the
precedents do not demand from the litigants (especially the
schools) the kind of evidence that would enable a judge to enter
into cost-benefit formula and arrive at a clear answer. Instead,
judges must compare qualitative descriptions of an educational
benefit versus complaints about the necessity of raciallydisparate treatment. Reasonable judges look at the same
information and come down on different sides.220 The Supreme
Court’s instruction in Fisher to be less deferential to the schools
has not yielded a clearer ruling on remand.221
The cost-benefit analysis utilized in the strict scrutiny test
could be fine-tuned by adding a requirement that such schools
internalize the burden. Schools that use the race-plus factor
should account for and accommodate those displaced by their
race-based admissions preferences. Such a requirement would
induce the parties to disclose more information, which would
help to demonstrate more precisely the actual cost-benefit
balance of the program.
C.

Market-Inalienability: Moral Concern and Justification

In proposing to have the beneficiaries accommodate the
burden-bearers, this article makes Grutter’s cost-benefit
analysis explicit and may invite objections on moral grounds.
Put plainly, some may feel that seats in universities should not
be bought and sold. The prospect of compensating displaced
applicants and potentially monetizing their burden may strike
some as unseemly even if the objective is to save affirmative
action from misguided political backlash. Objections on moral
and humanistic grounds can be evaluated and addressed using
Margaret Radin’s framework of market-inalienability. 222 The
220. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (9-7 vote
denying petition for rehearing en banc); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th
Cir. 2002) (en banc panel divided 5-4); Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.
1996) (per curiam) (8-7 vote denying petition for rehearing en banc); cf. Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th
Cir. 2012) (en banc panel divided 8-7).
221. See supra Part IV.B. discussion of Fisher.
222. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
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framework is useful not only to critique the proposal but also
demonstrates the value of the diversity rationale and provides a
moral justification for the proposal.
In its simple form, the market-inalienability framework
holds that some things can be given but not sold,223 because the
buying and selling of things or even the discussion of things in
terms of their buying and selling have a tendency to commodify
the thing being transacted or discussed in terms of
transactions.224 When things are commodified, they are made
fungible, and when a thing that is near and dear to human
personhood, such as human organs or babies, is rendered
fungible, the result is “an inferior conception of human
flourishing.”225 To avoid this diminished sense of humanity, it is
necessary to prohibit the sale of certain things, which could
otherwise be transferred through gifts, such as the adoption of
children and donation of organs. Hence, “market-inalienability”
emphasizes the idea that certain things cannot be alienated
through transactions in the marketplace even though they may
be alienated as gifts on non-economic terms.226
The type of accommodation proposed in this article is purely
compensatory. To the extent the accommodation is monetized
(it need not be) and takes the form of a school’s “purchase” and
the would-be admit’s “sale” of her entitlement to race-neutral
admissions review, the transaction is confined to the two
parties. 227 Such a bilateral compensatory transaction cannot
spread to other parties. No “market” could form nor could any
of the other outward trappings of commodification such as
“supply and demand pricing, brokerage and arbitrage,
advertising and marketing, stockpiling, speculation, and
valuation in terms of the opportunity cost of production”
materialize.228 The would-be admit can only be compensated by
223. Id. at 1850.
224. Id. at 1836, 1871-72.
225. Id. at 1885-86.
226. Id. at 1850, 1853.
227 . Radin considers “[s]ales caused by official monetization of
nonmonetary interests” including “compensation in tort” to be a “narrow” form
of commodification, but does not object to monetization of tort harms. Id. at
1859 n.43. Compensatory transactions are inherently limited in scope, deeply
grounded in the law and cannot be readily commodified.
228. Id. at 1855.
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the school that burdened her, and she cannot sell or assign her
entitlement to anyone else. The school remains in firm control
of which students may have access to the admitted class because
the school determines who receives the race-plus factor and who
is burdened.
Radin is also concerned by the use of market rhetoric to
describe social interactions that do not involve buying and
selling as if they were transactions, because market rhetoric, in
turn, can cause people to use market methodologies, such as
monetary cost-benefit analysis, to evaluate those social
interactions. 229 Once the social interactions are understood
through market vernacular, there is a tendency to reach for
market mechanisms to regulate the interactions. 230 Since
market mechanisms often ignore human interests that are not
“readily monetizable[,]” those interests can be unintentionally
diminished when liability rules take hold.231 This article uses
the rhetoric of “benefits” and “burdens” to describe impact of
affirmative action in higher education, but does so to clarify the
cost-benefit analysis that the Supreme Court is already applying
to the subject matter. Whereas Radin’s framework is oriented
against theories of universal commodification that call for
“unrestricted choice for individuals to maximize individual
gains from trade,” the accommodation proposal in this article is
intended to maximize collective benefits to society or at least to
preserve society’s choice to pursue a course toward greater
progress, equality and, as we shall see, human flourishing.232
On a deeper level, Radin’s promotion of human flourishing,
which is based on her conception of personhood, directly
supports the diversity rationale and provides a more
fundamental justification for the proposal to accommodate.
Radin describes personhood as consisting of three overlapping
aspects – (1) freedom, (2) identity and (3) contextuality – and
human flourishing requires satisfactory contributions to
personhood in each of these three aspects.233

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1859.
Id. at 1836, 1878.
Id. at 1878.
Id. at 1860-61.
Id. at 1804, 1861.
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Identity “focuses on the integrity and continuity of the self
required for individuation.” 234 Rather than a static concept,
identity is a process cultivated through “personal individuation”
and “self-development.” 235 Individuation, or the formation of
self-identity, occurs not in a vacuum but through interactions
with one’s surroundings or contextuality, which “focuses on
the necessity of self-constitution in relation to the environment
of things and other people.” 236 In other words, “to be
differentiated human persons, unique individuals, we must have
relationships with the social and natural world.”237 Freedom,
as “the will, or the power to choose for oneself”238 is the ability of
the individual to “self-develop in accordance to one’s will in
relation to one’s environment and other people.”239 This term
should not be understood in the narrow sense of individuals
choosing their identities, but having the kind of nurturing
environment in which they have the ability to “will certain
interactions [that are] integral to self-development.”240 Radin
describes freedom as “a positive commitment to act so as to
create and maintain particular contexts of environment and
community.”241 The guarantee of freedom, as it is understood
this way, is not so much a refrain from interfering with
individual will, as it is an affirmative duty to create that
environment which is conducive to self-development.242
Radin’s model of personhood in which individual identity is
cultivated in a conducive environment echoes the diversity
234. Id. at 1904 (“In order to have a unique individual identity, we must
have selves that are integrated and continuous over time.”).
235. Id. at 1905 (“Contextuality means that physical and social contexts
are integral to personal individuation, to self-development.”).
236. Id. at 1904, 1906. (“One’s surroundings – both people and things –
can become part of who one is, of the self.”).
237. Id. at 1904.
238. Id. (“In order to be autonomous individuals, we must at least be able
to act for ourselves through free will in relation to the environment of things
and other people.”).
239. Id. at 1905.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (Hence, “a positive view of freedom, in which the self-development
of the individual is linked to pursuit of proper social development, and in which
proper self-development, as a requirement of personhood, could in principle
sometimes take precedence over one’s momentary desires or preferences.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5

64

2014 PROTECTING DIVERSITY IN THE IVORY TOWER

725

rationale, which calls for a campus environment that is dynamic,
varied and free, that is stimulating and yet respectful of the
formation of each student’s identity.
In a less-varied
environment, individuals may not appreciate the other
possibilities against which they can reflect their self-awareness
and enhance their self-understanding and thus be limited in
their self-development. In a more conforming environment, they
may not be able to explore or choose a particular self-identity.
The affirmative commitment to creating and maintaining an
environment conducive to self-development that Radin calls for,
is the same commitment that the Supreme Court made in
Grutter to preserve diversity in higher education.
In creating that diverse learning environment, schools bring
together students not only of different race and ethnicities but
also from varied geographic, social and economic backgrounds,
having different talents, interests and conceptions of the world,
and place them in one setting where intense self-development
occurs. In this setting, students may learn (or are more likely to
realize) that despite their differences in appearance, background
and prior beliefs, that they share much more than their
differences would suggest, that they are united by a common
curiosity to learn, by the ways in which they have learned to
understand and engage in each other’s differences, by their
common enthusiasm for the life ahead, and simply by their
experience of living and learning together. From this setting,
they carry these shared experiences with them for the rest of
their lives to all the places they venture and draw on them to
engage in the people they meet and the ideas they encounter,
and perhaps, use those experiences to shape the new settings
over which they may exert influence.243
In many respects, the diverse setting created on campus
reflects an idealized view of America and the world. It is a
setting that is not readily found in the environments in which
most of the students are raised. This is what makes diversity in
higher education so special and so appealing to those who have
experienced it. It represents an ideal concept of what the
country and the world could and should be. It is rooted in the
243. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (regarding
the importance of diversity in the training of leaders).
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self-conception of the U.S. national identity, whether e pluribus
unum or the quest for “a more perfect Union.” 244 Having a
united but diverse society depends on people whose selfidentities are comfortable with the diversity of their country and
world.
Now having understood Radin’s conception of personhood
and its support for the diversity rationale, consider the impact
of affirmative action on personhood. Grutter’s requirement for
individualized review of applications pays due respect to the
uniqueness of individual applicants, but its acceptance of critical
mass transforms the same individual applicants into seemingly
fungible equivalents along racial and ethnic lines. When a
school publishes statistics of the racial and ethnic composition of
the admitted class, all members in that class are instantly deindividualized and sorted along group lines. A common defense
of critical mass, that more than a few underrepresented minority
students are need to be present on campus to avoid any one from
being regarded as a “token minority” whose beliefs and behavior
might be erroneously stereotyped to represent his or her entire
racial or ethnic group, is itself couched in terms of avoiding
fungibility.245 But the notion that applicants should be made
fungible on the basis of their race so that some of the admitted
students could be perceived as not fungible seems to be an
unsatisfactory promotion of personhood. Race and ethnicity,
which are determined by an individual’s internal genetic and
cultural make-up on the one hand, and society’s external
constructs of race and ethnicity on the other, cannot be readily
altered by the individual. Society’s external constructs are in
turn influenced by the “rhetoric of race-conscious admissions,”
which has an adverse impact on personhood.
Consider Natasha Scott, a typical senior at a magnet high
school in suburban Maryland applying to college in the fall of
2010. 246 Her mother is Asian, her father is black, and she
244. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
245. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320 (“Racial stereotypes lose their force because
nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a
variety of viewpoints among minority students.”).
246. Susan Saulny & Jacques Steinberg, On College Forms, A Question of
Race, or Races, can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14admissions.html?_r=0.
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identified herself as of both races in high school. But when she
applied to college, she wondered how to answer the question
about race on the applications and sought advice anonymously
from an online bulletin board for applicants, parents and
advisors:
I just realized that my race is something I have to
think about, . . . It pains me to say this, but
putting down black might help my admissions
chances and putting down Asian might hurt it.247
Every web commenter advised her to put down only AfricanAmerican as did her mother. She followed their advice and was
admitted to a prestigious school, but admits feeling guilty about
“denying a part of [her]self to look like a more appealing college
candidate.” 248 Scott was forced to internalize the rhetoric of
race-conscious admissions and deny part of her identity on her
application. In so doing, she had to break the integrity and
continuity of her self-identity, which diminished the identity
aspect of her personhood. Scott’s dilemma is felt by many
applicants, but whereas Scott seemingly had a choice, most do
not. 249
This dilemma weighs on the applicants’ sense
personhood and leads to an inferior sense of human flourishing.
Note too, the impact that those surrounding Scott had on
her decision – the perception of her mother and the commenters
that putting down a non-favored race would hurt her chances.
This is an example of a less tolerant contextuality working
against the will of individuals to choose the course of their selfdevelopment. In the case of Scott, the alteration to her selfidentity was perhaps temporary.
Once in the tolerant
contextuality of college, she could identify herself inwardly and
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Some Asian-American applicants leave blank the race box or check
“white” to avoid what they believe to be higher hurdles facing Asian-American
applicants at selective schools. Jesse Washington, Some Asians’ College
Strategy:
Don’t
Check
‘Asian’,
A.P.
(Dec.
3,
2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/asians-college-strategy-dont-check-asian174442977.html. See also Scott Jaschik, Is It Bias? Is It Legal? INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/02/03/federalprobe-raises-new-questions-discrimination-against-asian-americanapplicants.
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outwardly as mixed race again. Even as affirmative action is
helping to foster an ideal setting for learning on-campus, the
rhetoric of race-conscious admissions is creating a more raciallycharged and less tolerant contextuality just outside the gates.
To gain admission to the more ideal setting inside the ivory
tower, where personhood could develop in freedom, must
applicants make uncomfortable compromises with their identity
while they are still on the outside looking in? With the political
backlash against affirmative action eroding the very
commitment to create the diverse learning environment (Radin’s
freedom), we can conclude that the Grutter regime is
undermining all three aspects of personhood.
Thus, we are confronted by the trade-off between the
promotion of personhood within the diverse learning
environment and the impingements on personhood by the
rhetoric of race-conscious admissions. Radin’s framework is
flexible enough to recognize that in a “nonideal” world, certain
forms of “partial commodification” may be justified if they can
facilitate, not hinder, the eventual realization of a more “ideal
world.” 250 The quest to reach the “ideal world,” which she
describes as the “transition dilemma for social progress” coheres
with the Grutter majority’s desire to move toward raceneutrality over the sunset period.251 The proposal in this article
to modify the Grutter regime with the accommodation
requirement uses partial commodification to preserve diversity
in the present and facilitate the transition toward raceneutrality in the not-too-distant future. 252 Gifts, which

250. See Radin, supra note 222, at 1903, 1924.
251. Id. at 1915 & n.238. Radin could be speaking for the Court in Grutter
when she says: “We cannot make progress toward the noncommodification that
might exist under ideal conditions of equality and freedom by trying to
maintain noncommodification now under historically determined conditions of
inequality . . . .” Id. at 1906.
252. Radin’s only caveat against using partial commodification to ease the
transition is the risk that commodification rhetoric in the interim will make
the realization of the ideal eventuality less likely. Id. at 1915. The proposal
here may involve limited compensatory transactions that are not susceptible
to marketization. Any harm to the personhood of applicants from liability rules
(i.e., partial commodification) is outweighed by the harm caused by the current
race-conscious admissions regime. Id.
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strengthen social relationships and reinforce personhood, can
also be used in accommodation.253
VI.

Accommodation Mechanisms

We now know that it is preferable to settle with the real
burden-bearers of affirmative action when the cost of not settling
is higher. We have also identified at least two promising
accommodation mechanisms (Rules 2 & 5) from the menu of
standard remedies that could redress the would-be admits and
ease the political backlash. What are missing is the price, if any,
and the logistics of arranging the settlement.
According to Liu’s negligible burden hypothesis, the wouldbe admits are not appreciably burdened by their displacement
because they have nearly as good if not better alternative schools
to attend. 254 If that were true, a token sum may satisfy their
burden. In Hopwood, the district court ordered UT-Austin and
its law school to pay a dollar to each of the plaintiffs.255 Nominal
compensation could also come in the form of a gift card from the
campus store or honorary affiliation with the school. Or it could
be admissions-related such as guaranteed acceptance if the
would-be admit were to re-apply as a transfer student or even a
plus-factor preference on any applications to graduate schools at
the same institution.
If there is concern that a low price on the school’s call option
(Rule 2) might undercompensate the would-be admit, the rulemaker can vest the put option with her (Rule 5) so she can reject
the settlement offer and force the school to admit her. With Rule
5, she can never be undercompensated. If many would-be
admits did so, the school might have too many matriculating
students, a problem they regularly resolve by offering deferrals
to the incoming class. Regardless of what the would-be admits
decide, the school can certify that no one is burdened by its use
of race. An option price that is set too high may give a windfall
to the would-be admits and force schools to expend greater

253. Id. at 1908.
254. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1093.
255. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 923-24 (W.D. Tex. 1998), rev’d
on other grounds, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
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resources than necessary to achieve diversity. The rule-maker
can withdrawal from price setting altogether, and allow the
school to determine the price on the would-be admit’s option.
Each school can develop its own package of incentives to
persuade the would-be admits to go elsewhere.256
Schools could also look for other students in the admitted
class who are willing to give up their seat for the race-plus
admits for a lower price. Suppose a school accepted 124 raceplus admits and must internalize the burden of displacement.
Instead of reaching out to the would-be admits, the school could
invite members of the admitted class to take on that burden and
attend another school in exchange for compensation. Since
many admitted students may prefer other schools that also
accepted them, they may value a seat at this school less than the
would-be admits, and would gladly accept a lower buy-out offer.
Once a sufficient number of respondents had accepted the offer
and agreed to be displaced, the school could then certify that it
has internalized the burden of its race-based admissions
preferences.257 The number of students who must accept this
offer for the school to internalize the burden should be equal to
the number of would-be admits, which as we have seen is the
number of applicants that the school expects that it would have
to admit to fill the seats that otherwise went to the race-plus
admits.
The accommodation mechanism could also operate with
gifts, as per Radin’s model, instead of cash, goods or
opportunities of value. A school could appeal to its applicants to
consider the greater good of diversity in higher education and
ask them to taken on the burden of displacement without any
material inducement. This offer could be made, as in the
example above, to students in the admitted class who are still
deciding between schools. It could also be made at an earlier
stage in the admission process.

256. A school could bargain with each would-be admit individually and
reach different settlement amounts. Such an approach would be very narrowly
tailored; but for the ease of administration, it would be more practicable for the
school to set one price for all of its would-be admits.
257. Unassisted minority admits are just as eligible to accept the buy-out
offer but race-plus admits are not.
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A school could ask for volunteers among its applicants to
step forward and allow themselves to be rejected so that
underrepresented minority applicants could be admitted with
the race-plus factor in their place. In every admission cycle,
some applicants will withdrawal their applications from one or
more schools for various reasons. Many do so because they have
already received more attractive offers or scholarships from
other institutions. This voluntary burden acceptance approach
targets these applicants by asking them to consider waiving
their right to race-neutral treatment and consenting to be used
to burdened with rejection. 258 If an applicant agrees to be
designated a “voluntary burden-bearer,” the school must then
determine if this volunteer would have been admitted. If the
volunteer was going to be admitted, then the school can fill the
vacated seat in the admitted class with a race-plus admit.
To give to a cause, a donor must believe in the cause. This
altruistic form of burden-internalization tests the willingness of
applicants, who may attend other schools with diverse
campuses, to make a symbolic gesture in support of diversity in
higher education.
Having voluntary burden-bearers step
forward and cover the cost of affirmative action would be a
powerful demonstration of the beneficiaries’ commitment to
diversity.
Each of the mechanisms described above would incur fairly
low settlement costs (at least lower than demoralization costs to
justify settlement under Michelman’s model). They also satisfy
Calabresi’s call for burden internalization. Other mechanisms
can be devised along the same lines so long as they meet the
foregoing conditions. 259 A school operating a race-conscious
admissions program should make annual certifications that it
has offset any displacement effect of its race-conscious
admissions decisions by accommodating those who would have
been displaced or finding qualified burden bearers to take on
258. These applicants, by virtue of the more attractive alternatives they
have, are likely to be admitted if they do not inform the school of their change
of intention.
259. There would be no retroactive application of the accommodation
requirement as schools currently operating race-conscious admissions
programs are doing so legally. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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those burdens. Along with this certification, the school should
also report its race-plus usage during each application cycle.
Disclosure of this statistic helps to inform the public of the true
scale of affirmative action’s impact, as well as the schools’
dependence on the race-plus factor. Over time, such statistics
can help track progress toward the narrowing of the
achievement gap.
Greater disclosure of information about how racial
preferences are used in admissions process may heighten for a
time, race consciousness on campus, but revealing accurate
information about race-based preferences will help disprove the
false burden effect. Some may worry about the impact that the
proposal may have on minority students themselves. The
distinction between unassisted minority admits and race-plus
admits emphasized here might make minority students more
self-conscious. Schools can protect their race-plus admits by not
informing them or anyone else of their status.
VII.

Effect of Burden Internalization

If the benefits of diversity significantly outweigh the
burdens of affirmative action, as this author believes, the change
in the type of legal protection for affirmative action (from
property to liability rules) will have a limited effect on the
student composition of most campuses. Most selective schools
would still admit the best minority applicants they can and
make the accommodation necessary to permit their continued
use of the race-plus factor as they need. The actual pay-out, if
any, would not be onerous. Nevertheless, the accommodation
and information disclosure requirements would alter the
incentive structure sustaining diversity in higher education and
produce welcomed effects on how diversity programs are
managed, how minority students are motivated, and how
affirmative action is perceived.
A.

Impact on Schools

The specific impact of burden internalization will vary with
each school’s reliance on race-conscious measures to achieve
diversity. Schools that do not consider race in admissions,
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including those that use only race-neutral means to attain
diversity, will be unaffected. Selective schools that can assemble
critical masses of minority students entirely through unassisted
minority admits can certify that while they consider race in
admissions, they do not need to accommodate because they are
not giving race-based preferences. Such schools will be the
model under the new regime. Their reputation for not having to
use race as a plus-factor will attract more high achieving
minority students who do not want to be stigmatized by the
suspicion that they had benefited from racial preferences. These
top minority students can in turn help the schools maintain
diversity costlessly. A virtuous cycle thus develops.
Other selective schools that depend on the race-plus factor
would have to determine whether the resources they devote to
race-conscious admissions are worth the benefits. In so doing,
they must evaluate how well their diversity programs are
working and compare the benefits they currently derive with
that which they might obtain from race-neutral means to
achieve campus diversity. Some schools may make the switch to
race-neutrality if they believe any decline in educational benefits
to be slight relative to the cost savings. Other schools might find
it worthwhile to increase their use of the race-plus factor because
the benefits they derive far outweigh the accommodation costs.
Many schools will emulate the model schools by attracting and
accepting more unassisted minority admits.260
As race-plus admits become more costly to enroll, selective
schools will find it worthwhile to help convert these students
into unassisted minority admits.
After all, colleges and
universities are better at teaching than compensating, and they
have considerable unused capacity to help incubate minority
youths into competitive applicants. 261 Resources used to
accommodate could instead be spent on helping these students.
260. Applicants from non-favored racial groups who can contribute to
racial or ethnic diversity on campus will also be in greater demand. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke
438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
261. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 224 (2003) (criticizing
American higher education for failing to take a more direct and active role in
efforts to narrow the achievement gap in secondary education).
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Admissions counseling, summer classes, and preparatory
courses can all improve an applicants’ credentials.262 Many postsecondary schools already offer special college preparatory
programs but only for paying students. 263 Under the new
regime, schools would have a much greater incentive to work
directly toward narrowing the achievement gap.264
B.

Impact on Underrepresented Minority Students

The premium that schools will place on unassisted minority
applicants will in turn alter the achievement incentives for
minority students, particularly those who are just below the
race-neutral cutoff. Currently, this latter group can reliably
gain admission, but as schools work to reduce accommodation
costs, having slightly higher grades and test scores would
suddenly become much more consequential. A better grade in
Algebra II or a few points higher on the SATs may mean
scholarships and offers from better schools or avoiding
mandatory remedial programs that some schools might require
race-plus admits to attend. Thus, modifying the Grutter regime
by adding the accommodation requirement might provide just
the type of motivation for minority students to make
incremental efforts to improve their academic credentials that
Justice Thomas wants, but without the harsh effect of
immediately throwing them into “the cauldron of
competition.” 265 The paradigm shift would allow for a milder
262. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE
VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
8-10
(2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf (permitting
schools to institute pipeline, outreach and mentoring programs to increase
minority achievement at the high school and college level).
263. After the passage of Proposition 209, the University of California’s
system devoted more resources to cultivate minority students in secondary and
primary education to expand the pool of competitive minority applicants.
James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/02/magazine/the-class-of-prop209.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
264. Cf. Scott Jaschik, Baylor Pays for SAT Gains, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct.
15, 2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/10/15/baylor (school
gives incentives to admittees to score higher on SATs).
265. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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transition toward race-neutrality than what the Grutter
dissenters demand, but would work steadily to erode affirmative
action’s implicit race-norming effects. Better preparation will
help these minority students excel once they enroll, and reduce
the concern that they will be “mismatched” with their school.266
C.

Enlisting The Support of Diversity’s Beneficiaries

Accommodation costs will vary with each school, its
applicant profile and the type of accommodation mechanism
adopted but even the least costly form of accommodation plus
efforts to boost minority achievement will require schools to
expend additional resources and manpower under the proposed
regime. To cover these costs, schools can draw on the manifold
beneficiaries of diversity, whose willingness to contribute can be
powerful demonstration of how much they value this good.
Aside from dipping into their own budgets and endowments,
schools can seek government funding, which would more broadly
socialize the cost of diversity. Since the educational benefits are
compelling to the government, it may be appropriate for society
to pay for this public good. In this era of public budget deficits,
spending cuts, and declining public appetite for affirmative
action, however, public finding may be difficult to secure.
Current and prospective students who have or are about to
partake in the diverse learning environment created for their
benefit are another source for support. Raising tuition would
test their willingness (and that of their parents) to pay for
diversity. Following the passage of Proposition 2009, students
at UC Berkeley approved the assessment of a student fee to fund
minority outreach. 267 Prospective and even current students,
however, have not experienced the full extent of diversity’s
benefits and may underappreciate its value. A fee hike also tests
the ability to pay more than willingness to pay. With tuition
growing faster than inflation, further fee increases will make
higher education even less affordable.
266. For the mismatch effect, see SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 166.
267. See
Constitution,
BRIDGES MULTICULTURAL RES. CTR.,
https://callink.berkeley.edu/organization/bridgesmulticulturalresourcecenter/
DocumentLibrary/View/57432 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
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Schools can appeal to their alumni for donations of their
time and money to sustain on-campus racial diversity. The
broader societal benefits of diversity are spread through the
graduates, and the rate of alumni donation is frequently used to
measure student satisfaction.268 Asking these beneficiaries to
contribute to a diversity preservation fund would reveal how
much graduates value their learning experience. Further afield,
Corporate America has been among the most enthusiastic amici
supporters of affirmative action.269 Big businesses believe that
having a workforce trained in a diverse environment is vital to
their success in the global marketplace. 270 And where would
elite law firms recruit the top-flight minority lawyers if the end
to affirmative action constricted the pipeline? These wealthier
beneficiaries of diversity should be tapped for support.
D. Informing the Public
If schools can accommodate those who are displaced by racebased admissions preferences (or finding volunteers to take on
the burdens) and demonstrate the favorable cost-benefit balance
of diversity, then affirmative action would become far less
controversial.
Rejected applicants who do not receive
accommodation offers will realize that they would have fared no
better under a race-neutral admissions scheme. Reaching this
kind of understanding is particularly important as the false
victim effect is likely to multiply as admissions rates fall at
selective schools.
With race-plus usage reported annually, the public will be
able to track higher education’s progress toward the narrowing
the achievement gap and compare the track record of different
schools. The accommodation requirement is designed to obviate
itself when schools can enroll critical masses of minority
students without using race-based preferences. When this
eventuality is realized, the aspirations of formal equality will
268. See LEMANN, supra note 65.
269 . See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
270. See Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 269, at 5.
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converge with the reality of substantive equality, and thereby
fulfilling the goal of colorblind equal protection while sustaining
racial diversity. Individual schools may reach this juncture at
different points in time. The new regime does not require the
rule-maker to impose an arbitrary sunset date like Grutter’s 300
month countdown. It is possible that the achievement gap would
not narrow for a considerable period of time, perhaps even
beyond 2028. There may be other racial or ethnic groups that
schools may deem necessary to the on-campus diversity that
may need preferences from time to time. Liability rule
protection for affirmative action, with its ability to internalize
the burden and ease majority resentment can better sustain
diversity over the longer term.
When the public realizes how preciously few actually
receive the race-plus boost, then more attention could be paid to
the vast majority of disadvantaged underrepresented minority
students whose needs have never been addressed by affirmative
action.271 The resources, energy and time spent on protracted
litigation and public ballot initiatives over race in admissions
could be better used to address the underlying causes of the
achievement gap.272
VIII.

Conclusion

For too long the two sides of the affirmative action dispute
have traded claims about the burdens of racial preferences
versus the benefits of diversity. They have managed to convince
rule-makers in different forums to enact opposing laws, but have
271. See, e.g., SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., GIVEN HALF A CHANCE: THE
SCHOTT 50 STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 2 (2008)
(noting that fewer than half of black male high school students in the United
States graduated with their peers in the 2005-2006 school year).
272. Fisher has appealed her case a second time to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Samantha Ketterer, Fisher Requests Supreme Court Hear Case Against
UT
a
Second
Time,
DAILY
TEXAN
(Feb.
11,
2015)
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2015/02/11/fisher-requests-supreme-courthear-case-against-ut-a-second-time. Anti-affirmative action ballot initiatives
could appear in several more states including Ohio, Missouri and Utah. See
John Lauerman & Janet Lorin, Affirmative Action Ruling Challenges Colleges
Seeking
Diversity,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
23,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-23/affirmative-action-rulingchallenges-colleges-seeking-diversity.html.
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not conclusively answered each other’s claims. This article
brings the various points and counterpoints under one
framework of analysis. Only by breaking down the traditional
fault lines can steps forward be discussed.
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